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BYTES, BALCO, AND BARRY BONDS: AN
EXPLORATION OF THE LAW
CONCERNING THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
OF COMPUTER FILES AND AN ANALYSIS
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN
UNITED STATES V. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG
TESTING, INC.
DEREK REGENSBURGER*
In United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
recently held that the government may retain copies of drug testing results
seized outside the scope of a search warrant because they were
intermingled with results which were lawfully seized. The ruling has the
potential to impact the way in which computer searches are conducted as
well as the privacy of confidential medical records which become the
subject of government investigations. This Article provides an in-depth
analysis of this decision as well as traces the development of the law
surrounding the search and seizure of computer records and files.
I. INTRODUCTION
"What happened to the Fourth Amendment? Was it repealed
somehow?"' Those are the chilling words of U.S. District Judge James
Mahan, echoed by Ninth Circuit Judge Sidney Thomas in his dissent in
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. ("CDT'). 2  The
questions are in reference to federal agents' seizure and subsequent search
of confidential medical records in relation to their investigation of the
illegal distribution of steroids by the Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative
* The author is the lead instructor in the Legal Studies Department at Everest College in
Thornton, Colorado. He is a former Deputy District Attorney in Sterling, Colorado, and a
graduate of the George Washington University School of Law.
I United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. ("CDT"), 473 F.3d 915, 944 (9th




("BALCO").3 The agents had issued subpoenas to and then executed search
warrants on two independent testing labs to obtain the steroid testing
records of ten Major League Baseball ("MLB") players who had
connections to their investigation of BALCO. The Ninth Circuit upheld
the agents' seizure and subsequent search of computer files, which
contained steroid drug testing results not only for the ten targets of the
federal investigation, but countless other athletes inside and outside of
baseball.'
Because of its connection to steroids and the government's
investigation into BALCO and San Francisco Giants' slugger Barry Bonds,
the decision received nationwide attention. Bonds's name is inextricably
tied to the BALCO investigation, having been linked to BALCO and steroid
use in a recent New York Times bestseller.6 Bonds was recently indicted on
pejury and obstruction of justice charges that stemmed from allegedly false
statements he made to the federal grand jury investigating illegal steroid
distribution at BALCO.7 It has even been speculated that one of the
motivations behind the government's initial investigation of BALCO was a
personal vendetta that the government's lead investigator, Jeff Novitsky,
had against Bonds.
8
Apart from its notoriety, the CDT decision is important in several
respects. First, it attempts to define the parameters and limitations involved
in computer searches, particularly with respect to the seizure and
subsequent search of intermingled files.9  The CDT court held that
government agents can seize entire collections of computer data for off-site
review where files within the scope of the search warrant are intermingled
with irrelevant data on the computer's hard drive.10 It also permitted the
government to browse the contents of computer files to determine if they
are within the scope of the warrant, without having to limit such a search to
key words or file type." This part of the ruling recognizes the inherent
need for flexibility in conducting computer searches.
' Id. at 922.
4 Id. at 920-22.
' Id. at 923-24.
6 MARK FAINARU-WADA & LANCE WILLIAMS, GAME OF SHADOWS: BARRY BONDS,
BALCO, AND THE STEROIDS SCANDAL THAT ROCKED PROFESSIONAL SPORTS (2006). Judge
Thomas picked up on this theme in his dissent, castigating the government for engaging in a
"prosecution of shadows." CDT, 473 F.3d at 979 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
7 Dave Sheinin, Home Run King Bonds Charged with Perjury, WASH. POST, Nov. 16,
2007, at AO1.
8 Jonathan Littman, Gunning for the Big Boy, PLAYBOY, May 2004, at 69-70.
9 CDT, 473 F.3d at 933-35.
10 Id. at 934.
" Id. at 935.
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Second, the decision is also notable for what it does not do-give
adequate protection to the privacy concerns of innocent third parties whose
records are caught up in the government's dragnet. The case raises a
fascinating question: What privacy concerns are implicated when the
government obtains confidential medical records from a disinterested third
party and what steps have to be taken to ensure that such concerns are not
violated? The majority opinion seems to give short shrift to privacy rights,
giving the government virtual carte blanche to search intermingled data that
it seizes. This power is subject to post-seizure review by a magistrate, but
this review is only after a proper objection has been filed by an aggrieved
party.1 2 In other words, the government is free to search the seized data
until such objection is made. Thus, the ruling affords somewhat uncertain
status to the prospect of effective judicial oversight, as there is no
mechanism for providing notice to aggrieved third parties that their
heretofore confidential records have been seized by the government. 13
In addition, given the myriad issues present in the case, the decision
may serve as the perfect vehicle for the United States Supreme Court
(should it be given the opportunity to review the case) to lay out a
consistent, uniform set of guidelines for the government to follow in
conducting computer searches-something that is sorely lacking in the
current jurisprudence on this issue.14 As will be discussed in Part II of this
2 Id. at 938.
13 Id. at 974 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
14 Petitions for Rehearing before the Panel and a Rehearing En Bane were filed in the
Ninth Circuit on February 12, 2007. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for panel
rehearing, withdrew its opinion issued on December 27, 2006, and issued a superseding
opinion on January 24, 2008. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d
1085 (9th Cir. 2008). The petition for rehearing En Banc was denied as moot with leave to
file a new motion. The Major League Baseball Players Association ("MLBPA") sought an
extension of time to file a Petition for Rehearing En Bane. That deadline is March 10, 2008,
but as of March 7, 2008, a petition had not been filed. It is uncertain at this time whether a
Petition for Certiorari will be filed if that motion is filed and is unsuccessful. The Ninth
Circuit panel ruled that the government's appeal of the order by Judge Florence-Marie
Cooper in the Central District of California, denying reconsideration of her earlier order
requiring the government to return property seized from the CDT laboratory in Long Beach,
was untimely filed and therefore refused to hear the appeal of that order. Id. at 1098-99.
However, the Ninth Circuit still had to determine whether the seizures which occurred at
CDT were lawful since the MLBPA based its challenge to the search warrant of the Quest
Diagnostics lab in Las Vegas on the ground that the CDT files were illegally seized and that
the government should be forbidden from using the fruits of an illegal search to form the
basis of the warrant to search for files at Quest. Id. at 1105. Finding that the government's
seizure of the files at CDT was valid, the Ninth Circuit reversed an order by Judge James
Mahan in the District of Nevada requiring the government to return property seized from
Quest Diagnostics. Id. at 1113. Finally, the Ninth Circuit also reversed an order by Judge
Susan Illston in the Northern District of California quashing the government's May 6, 2004,
subpoenas to CDT and Quest that related to the San Francisco grand jury's investigation of
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Article, the rules for conducting computer searches vary dramatically from
circuit to circuit. If the decision is reversed, at least in part, then in the
ultimate irony of ironies, the Supreme Court will have chastised the Ninth
Circuit for having been too conservative when it comes to protecting the
liberties and freedoms of individuals.
If nothing else, the CDT decision highlights the need for courts to
adopt a more uniform approach to computer searches. The case pitted the
two extremes of the current debate against one another. The majority took
the position that computer searches require nothing more than an extension
of the traditional rules governing searches of documentary evidence to the
digital realm.1 5 Conversely, Judge Thomas argued in a boisterous dissent
that computer searches require something more. He advocated for
magistrate review of intermingled computer files before government
investigators could inspect them, and argued that strict limits be placed on
the government's ability to subsequently search that data.
16
This Article attempts to clarify the existing law on computer searches
and lays out a framework for how such searches should be approached in
the future. Part II of this Article examines the current state of the law
regarding computer searches and explores the two contrasting approaches to
the problem. Next, it addresses what protections are currently available
with respect to maintaining the privacy and confidentiality of medical and
legal records which are seized in an investigation. It also examines how,
and under what circumstances, an aggrieved party may seek return of seized
property. Part III provides an in-depth analysis of and commentary on the
CDT decision. Part IV discusses how courts view the plain view doctrine's
operation in the digital search realm and addresses whether the doctrine
should apply at all in this context. Finally, in Part V, this Article provides
some recommendations as to how current search and seizure principles
should be applied to govern computer searches in the future.
II. DISCUSSION OF APPLICABLE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROVISIONS TO
COMPUTER SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The current state of the law surrounding computer searches is a bit like
parenting. There are lots of ideas as to how it should occur but no clear
agreement as to the right answer. Some courts have attempted to analogize
computers to closed containers or file cabinets in an attempt to meld
BALCO. Id. at 1114. In reversing these two district court orders, the Ninth Circuit applied
much the same analysis as it had in its original opinion.
"5 CDT, 473 F.3d at 935.
16 Id. at 965 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
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computer searches into existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 17 Other
courts have held that computers require a "special approach" to the question
and have imposed new restrictions on such searches which are not present
in areas outside this context. 18 Such legal gymnastics are unwarranted. To
borrow a phrase from Todd Bertuzzi, a computer "is what it is."' 9 Rather
than simply being akin to a container or file cabinet, a computer is much
more. It is anything and everything a user wants it to be-a file cabinet
containing thousands of personal files or business records, a personal
accountant, a photo album, a music or movie player, a virtual desk complete
with calendar and Rolodex, a research librarian, or a video game machine.
In effect, the search of a computer is in some ways no different today than a
search of a house or an office desk used to be; it just can be accomplished in
one-stop shopping.
Most computer searches occur using a standard protocol. First, the
computer is examined to see if it is in proper working order or has any
physical damage. 20  Next, the hard drive is removed, inspected, and
connected to a forensic computer for examination. 2 1 A write-blocking
device is installed between the suspect drive and the forensic computer to
prevent the examiner from accidentally writing information onto the suspect
drive.22 A bitstream copy of the hard drive is then made, including blank
space.23 The copy of the hard drive information is then analyzed by using
software such as EnCase, which allows investigators to examine the
contents of each file.24
A. WARRANT SPECIFICITY: PARTICULARITY AND BREADTH
In order to understand the rules governing computer searches, it is first
necessary to discuss the basic principles governing execution of search
warrants generally. To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a
17 See discussion infra United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
18 See discussion infra United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 n.7 (10th Cir. 1999).
19 On October 29, 2005, Bertuzzi was booed heavily in his first return to Denver after his
pre-meditated attack on Colorado Avalanche defenseman Steve Moore in a hockey game
between Vancouver and Colorado on March 8, 2004, and his subsequent suspension.
Bertuzzi responded to questioning about the crowd reaction by stating, "It is what it is. What
am I going to do about it?" Bertuzzi Jeered by Colorado Fans, CBC Sports, Jan. 23, 2007,
http://www.cbc.ca/sports/story/2005/10/27/canucks-avalancheO51027.html.








warrant must be specific. 25 However, a warrant need only be specific
enough to "permit the executing officer to exercise reasonable, rational and
informed discretion and judgment in selecting what should be seized. 26
"Specificity has two aspects: particularity and breadth.1
2 7
First, a warrant is said to be sufficiently particular if it sets forth
"general classifications of the items to be seized" which would enable the
executing officer to "ascertain and identify with reasonable certainty" the
items that he is authorized to seize.28 Depending upon the complexity of
the crimes under investigation, the court's focus should be on whether the
warrant is as particular as reasonably could be expected under the
circumstances. 29  Given that the search of a hard drive or other storage
media is inherently complex, some courts have found warrants to search
computers meet the particularity requirement even though they may only
generally describe the computer or storage media to be searched. 30 As will
be further explored below, this line of decisions recognizes that it is often
difficult for officers to precisely pinpoint the location of the desired
evidence when it is in digital form. This is because such evidence may be
contained in files on the hard drive of the computer or on various storage
media such as CD-ROMs or jump drives. It may even be hidden from view
entirely by encryption or other security methods.31 Other courts have
followed a different approach, instead requiring that warrants for computer
searches be limited more narrowly to specifically defined files or media and
to specific types of material and evidence.32
Second, breadth is defined as the "requirement that there be probable
cause to seize the particular thing named in the warrant. 3 3 A warrant is
thus overbroad if it includes items for which there is no probable cause to
25 Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
26 United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 57 (D. Conn. 2002)
(finding warrant that sought access to attorney's laptop was sufficiently particular because it
detailed the nature of criminal activity and types of files to be seized).
27 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 926 F.2d 847, 856 (9th Cir. 1991).
28 United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1992).
29 Triumph Capital, 211 F.R.D. at 57 (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480
n.10 (1976)).
30 United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding general
description of computer equipment which authorized blanket seizure of computer equipment
where officers knew that the defendant had downloaded images of child pornography but did
not know whether they were stored on the hard drive or disks); Triumph Capital, 211 F.R.D.
at 58.
31 Interview with Collin Reese, supra note 20.
32 United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005).
33 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 926 F.2d 847, 857 (9th Cir. 1991).
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search.34 In cases involving complex investigations, typified by the need to
assemble a "paper puzzle," courts have been more tolerant of broad warrant
provisions. 35 Where an item of interest is contained in a large collection of
files or documents, all items in the set may be inspected during a search,
provided that "specific guidelines for identifying the documents sought are
provided in the search warrant."
36
B. THE CAREY/WINICK DOCTRINE
Because of a computer's massive storage capacity, some courts have
been loath to authorize broad searches which allow agents seeming
unfettered discretion in deciding what files to seize and how they should be
searched.37 The Tenth Circuit has been the most ardent proponent of this
"special approach" to computer searches. The court first outlined this
doctrine in United States v. Carey.38 There, government agents seized two
personal computers while conducting a search for evidence of drug
possession and drug transactions. 39 After obtaining a second warrant to
search the computer files, a detective and a computer technician viewed the
directories on the hard drives and then downloaded and printed them.4 0 The
detective proceeded to use key word searches of text files, which did not
produce any evidence related to drug use or drug transactions but did
41disclose many files with sexually suggestive titles and a .jpg extension.
The detective did not know what the jpeg files were, but testified that the
image files could have contained evidence relating to the drug charges.42
Upon opening the first JPG file, the detective discovered what he
believed to be child pornography.43 He then downloaded 244 more image
files and continued to open and view a sampling of them.44 The Tenth
14 Triumph Capital, 211 F.R.D. at 59 (citing Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1478 (1Oth
Cir. 1997)) (finding warrant affidavit contained sufficient allegations of defendant's illegal
campaign finance activities and intent to purge the entire hard drive to establish probable
cause for warrant).
35 See United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11 th Cir. 1982).
36 United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1982). Specifics of the Tamura
case are discussed infra note 57.
37 See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999) (ruling that the
search of computer directories containing pornographic image files exceeded the scope of a
warrant permitting the search of a computer for evidence pertaining to drug transactions).
31 Id. at 1268.
'9 Id. at 1270.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1270-71.




Circuit held that the detective's search of all but the first image file
exceeded the scope of the search warrant.45 The court stated that the file
cabinet analogy may be "inadequate" in the computer context and noted
that a "special approach" is needed instead.46 It required that the warrant
demonstrate that such mislabeling is anticipated before such a general
search of the hard drive would be permitted:
While the scenario is likely, it is not representative of the facts of this case. This is
not a case in which ambiguously labeled files were contained in the hard drive
directory. It is not a case in which the officers had to open each file drawer before
discovering its contents. Even if we employ the file cabinet theory, the testimony of
Detective Lewis makes the analogy inapposite because he stated he knew, or at least
had probable cause to know, each drawer was properly labeled and its contents were
clearly described in the label.
47
The court also noted that because the computers had been removed
from the home, there were no "exigent circumstances" justifying a general
rummaging through the files on the hard drive.48 The court found that
investigators can generally employ "several methods" such as key word
searches or directory or file titles to avoid searching file types not identified
in the warrant.49 Thus, the court criticized the officers' failure to use the
information gained through the key word search (no evidence of drug
transactions) to limit their search appropriately. °
The court's approach in Carey has at its genesis an article written by
Raphael Winick in 1994.51 Winick theorized that because computers can
store "massive quantities" of information, they are fundamentally different
from closed containers which frame much of the traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis. 52  Therefore, according to Winick, a "different
analysis" under the Fourth Amendment is mandated.53 This approach
contains two steps. The first requires that officers apply for permission to
remove a computer and storage media from the premises.54 If that
permission is granted, the officers must then obtain a second warrant,
45 Id. at 1276. Based on the officer's testimony that the discovery of the first
pornographic image was inadvertent, the court limited its suppression ruling to the search of
all subsequent image files. Id. at 1273 n.4.
46 Id. at 1275 n.7.
47 Id. at 1274-75.
48 Id. at 1275-76.
49 Id. at 1276.
50 Id.
51 Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 75 (1994).
52 Id. at 89.
53 Id.
14 Id. at 107.
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specifying exactly what types of files are to be searched and the precise
methods which will be used to search those files.55
The first prong of Winick's test is essentially an adoption of the
intermingled document doctrine, first espoused in United States v.
Tamura.56  In Tamura, the court objected to the "wholesale seizure" of
entire filing cabinets of records without any efforts to limit the seizure of
unrelated material.57 The Tamura court suggested that, where it was
necessary to seize intermingled documents, the documents should be
"sealed and held pending approval by a magistrate of a further search. 58
Winick proposed a similar procedure for computer searches:
This rule holds that where officers come across relevant documents so intermingled
with irrelevant documents that they cannot feasibly be sorted at the site, the officers
may seal or hold the documents pending approval by a magistrate of the conditions
and limitations on a further search through the documents. If the officers know prior
to the search that transporting large quantities of documents or hardware is likely, they
can apply to the magistrate issuing the warrant for permission to remove such
material; permission should be granted only when on-site sorting of relevant and
irrelevant material is infeasible and no other practical alternative exists.
59
If removal of computer equipment and media is warranted, Winick
believed officers should not be allowed to conduct a full review of the files
contained on the storage media based simply on a "vague allegation" that
such review of all files was necessary in all cases.6 °  Instead, he
recommended that officers be forced to use such methods as keyword
searches to identify and read through only those files which "there is reason
to believe contain relevant information.'
" Id. at 108.
56 694 F.2d 591, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982).
57 Id. at 594-95. In Tamura, the warrant authorized the seizure of three specific
categories of business records. To locate the relevant records, the agents had to: (1) review
the computer printout, (2) locate the voucher that corresponded to a particular payment
recorded on the printout, and (3) find the check that corresponded to the voucher. Id. The
agents followed this procedure for a short time but quickly concluded that it would take too
long unless the employees helped them. Id. at 595. The agents threatened to seize all of the
company's accounting records for the previous ten years if such assistance was not
forthcoming. Id. When the employees refused, the agents seized eleven boxes of printouts,
thirty-four file drawers of vouchers, and seventeen drawers of canceled checks. Id.
58 Id. at 595-96.
59 Winick, supra note 51, at 105-06.
60 Id. at 108-09.
61 Id. at 108.
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Apart from the Tenth Circuit, only a handful of courts have adopted
Winick's two-pronged approach.62 In In re the Search of 3817 W. West
End, a magistrate judge for the Northern District of Illinois approved a
warrant to seize computers but refused to permit the government to search
the computer files until it provided a specific search protocol.63 The court
held that a generalized search of the computer was inappropriate because of
the "substantial likelihood" that it contained unrelated personal documents
intermingled with those related to tax fraud.64 The court relied on the fact
that computer searches could be limited by key words or to text or graphics
files. While noting that these tools are not the "exclusive means" for
conducting computer searches, the court found that their existence
"demonstrates the ability of the government to be more targeted in its
review of computer information than it can be when reviewing hard copy
documents in a file cabinet.,
65
C. A NEW "OLD" APPROACH TO COMPUTER SEARCHES
Winick's approach has come under increasing fire. Criminals have
begun using more sophisticated methods of concealing files and data which
can defeat the use of simple key word searches. For example, file types or
extensions can be changed to hide the true identify or content of the file.66
Incriminating files may also be deleted or encrypted.67 One commentator,
David Ziff, suggests that the better approach to computer searches is to
"import the same rules and standards used for searches of physical records
or documents. 68 Ziff argues that any type of file, regardless of whether it
is in a small stack of papers or in a computer containing thousands of files,
should receive the same level of protection. "If courts have approved of the
protection given to individual documents in the stack of twenty, there is no
reason to apply a different test simply because the stack has grown. 69
62 See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275-76 (10th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Barbuto, No. 2:00CR197K, 2001 WL 670930, at *4-5 (D. Utah Apr. 12, 2001); see
also United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 584 (D. Vt. 1998).
63 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 962-63 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
64 Id. at 958.
65 Id. at 959. Of course, this approach assumes that the government investigator must
rely on the file name or extension in conducting a computer search, but conversely, be free to
disregard such labels when searching a file cabinet.
66 See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531,
545 (2005).
67 id.
68 David J.S. Ziff, Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Execution of Computer
Searches Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 841, 861 (2005).
69 Id. at 869.
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Another commentator, Orin S. Kerr, has recently written a series of
articles advocating that the Carey/Winick approach be rejected in favor of a
more fluid approach which accommodates the interests of both parties.7 0
He notes that computer searches conducted in the virtual world are
inherently different from those conducted in the traditional physical sense
because "digital evidence searches generally occur at both a 'logical' or
'virtual' level and a 'physical' level., 7 1 According to Kerr, this "distinction
between physical searches and logical searches is fundamental in computer
forensics. 72  He explains the difference between logical and physical
searches as follows:
Consider a search for a picture file believed to be evidence of a crime. An examiner
might begin by conducting a logical search of the hard drive for files with extensions
known to be used for image files, such as ".jpg ....
This procedure sounds easy, but ordinarily does not suffice. It is easy to change the
extension of a file. To hide a picture, a user might take a file saved with a ".jpg"
extension and resave it with an extension common to a different kind of file, such as
".doc" or ".wpd." A search for picture files based on the logical file extensions will
no longer locate the file. Instead, the analyst will have to conduct a search at a
physical instead of a logical level. Software can locate image files at a physical level
by searching for file headers characteristic of known types of picture files .... The
file header remains unchanged regardless of the extension placed on the file, allowing
a physical search to uncover picture files that a logical search would not locate.
7 3
Consequently, Kerr notes officers are often forced to examine the "entire
digital haystack to find the needle. 7 4
Because files can be mislabeled, hidden, or deleted, a forensic
investigator can never be sure ahead of time which type of search may be
required. Due to forensic examiners' inability to forecast accurately what
course a digital search will take, Kerr criticizes the logic underlying the
Carey/Winick approach as "deeply flawed., 71 Instead, he proposes that
forensic examiners, not magistrates, are the persons who are best able to
dictate the search parameters:
70 See Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 279 (2005) [hereinafter Kerr, Digital Evidence]; Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment
and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV.
801 (2004); Kerr, supra note 66, at 531.
71 Kerr, supra note 66, at 544.
72 Id. A logical search is based on the contents of the files and the file types found on the
hard drive as delineated by the operating system, while a physical search identifies and
recovers data "across the entire physical drive without regard to the file system," Id.
73 Id. at 544-45 (footnotes omitted).
74 Kerr, Digital Evidence, supra note 70, at 304.
75 Kerr, supra note 66, at 572.
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It is difficult to know what the particular search requires and what tools are best suited
to find the evidence without first taking a look at the files on the hard drive. In a
sense, the forensics process is a bit like surgery: the doctor may not know how best to
proceed until he opens up the patient and takes a look. The ability to target
information described in a warrant is highly contingent on a number of factors that are
difficult or even impossible to predict ex ante.
In light of these difficulties, magistrate judges are poorly equipped to evaluate
whether a particular search protocol is the fastest and most targeted way of locating
evidence stored on a hard drive.
76
Another criticism of the CareyiWinick approach is that it does not take
into account the need for an officer to exercise his or her judgment in
determining the relevance of a file's contents.77 Thomas Clancy points out
that search protocols are context insensitive, and as a result, they cannot
always predict a document's incriminatory character or relevance to an
investigation. 78 An investigator often must review the contents of a file and
compare it to some known standard before forming an opinion as to its
usefulness. For example, in the context of a Medicare fraud investigation, a
key word search could be used to pull up all files pertaining to a particular
diagnosis code or treatment type. However, such a search may cast too
wide a net. The officer would still have to examine the contents of each file
to determine the authenticity of the injury or reasonableness of the fee
charged for the service provided.
Ziff proposes that the discretion of the officer should be checked, not
by search protocols, but instead by vigilantly defining and monitoring the
scope of the warrant:
[T]he ability to examine documents does not give searching officers the authority to
read the contents of any given file. Rather, the officers' authority extends only so far
as necessary to determine if a given document is within the scope of the warrant.
Once the examination reaches the point where it is clear that the document is outside
the scope of the warrant, the officer no longer has authority under the warrant to
continue reading the document.
79
Clancy also rejects the notion that there should be special rules for
electronic evidence containers. Otherwise, in his view, filing cabinets,
76 Id. at 575 (footnotes omitted).
77 Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and
Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 Miss. L.J. 193, 211 (2005) (citing Susan W.
Brenner & Barbara A. Frederiksen, Computer Searches and Seizures: Some Unresolved
Issues, 8 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 39, 60-62 (2002)).
78 Clancy cites that if "either the data encoding or the alleged criminal activity is
complex in nature, human judgment will be required to determine the evidentiary value of
specific electronic documents and whether the documents fall within the scope of the
warrant." Id. at 211.
79 Ziff, supra note 68, at 862 (footnotes omitted).
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diaries, books, floppy drives, hard drives, paper bags, and other storage
devices would "all require different rules. 8°
In a recent line of cases, courts outside the Tenth Circuit have
generally declined to follow the Carey/Winick "special approach. ''81 These
courts have recognized the difficulties inherent in conducting digital
searches and thus have been reluctant to tie the hands of investigators by
making them comply with rigid, pre-approved search protocols. Instead,
the courts have focused on the reasonableness of the government's actions
under the circumstances.
For example, in United States v. Hill,82 the Ninth Circuit adopted the
first prong of the Winick approach (the intermingled document doctrine) to
limit the seizure of computer hardware and media, but it refused to adopt
the second part to correspondingly limit agents' search of the data. In Hill,
a computer technician tipped off the police to what she believed to be child
pornography on the defendant's computer.83  The officers sought and
obtained a warrant for the computer and all storage media, but the
defendant picked up his computer before the warrant could be executed.84
The police then executed a second warrant on defendant's home and seized
storage media from his bedroom.85 A subsequent search of the media
revealed images of child pornography.86
80 Clancy, supra note 77, at 218.
81 See United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding seizure of emails
on girlfriend's computer proper where warrant authorized search for communications
evidencing extortion conspiracy and failure to limit search to a specific email program or file
was not unreasonable); United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2004), rev'din
part, 459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding seizure of computer media was proper, even in
absence of statement in affidavit that an inspection was not feasible on site, and search
warrant need not place restrictions on the search methodology used to analyze the seized
media); Fermaglich v. State, 2004 WL 2750262 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (unpublished decision)
(finding seizure of computer equipment did not exceed scope of warrant where warrant
permitted seizure of any and all records pertaining to purchase, use, and destruction of
drugs); United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Va. 1999) (finding seizure of
pornographic images of children is proper under a warrant entitling agents to seize evidence
relating to unauthorized access of a government computer because all files stored on
computer storage media may be examined to determine whether they contain evidence that
falls within the scope of a warrant); Frasier v. State, 794 N.E.2d 449 (Ind. App. 2004)
(finding warrant permitting search of computer for records of marijuana sales permitted
officers to seize pornographic images found in the course of that search and police did not
have to rely upon file labels or extensions in conducting search of computer).
82 322 F. Supp. 2d at 1089-91.






The defendant argued that the search was overbroad because it (1)
allowed the seizure of all computer media without requiring inspection at
the scene, and (2) it placed no limits or controls on the search methodology
the police used in analyzing the seized media.8 7 Judge Kozinski, sitting by
designation, rejected defendant's contentions. First, he found that
inspection and sorting of the media on site would be impractical because it
would: (1) pose a significant burden on smaller agencies to continuously
update their technology, (2) pose a serious risk of damaging or
compromising the integrity of evidence at the scene, and (3) take an
inordinately long time to accomplish. 8 Thus, the court concluded that the
police "were not required to examine defendant's electronic storage media
at the scene" for the presence of child pornography, but instead "were
entitled to seize all such media and take them to the police station for
examination by an expert.,
8 9
Judge Kozinski found that Tamura did not require a different result.
He concluded that, even in the absence of a specific showing that computer
files were difficult to sort on-site, the procedures outlined in Tamura for
seizure of intermingled evidence had been complied with:
The warrant here authorized precisely such a seizure of intermingled materials that
are difficult and time-consuming to separate on-site. That the officer seeking the
warrant did not make a specific showing to this effect is of no consequence: The
difficulties of examining and separating electronic media at the scene are well known.
It is doubtless with these considerations in mind that the state court judge authorized
seizure of all of defendant's storage media, not merely those containing contraband or
evidence of a crime.
90
The Ninth Circuit did not approve of Judge Kozinski's conclusion on
this point, however. The court held that the warrant was overbroad in the
absence of an explanatory affidavit as to why such a blanket seizure of
computer equipment was necessary.9' The court noted that the government
does not have an "automatic blank check" in such circumstances but must
instead "demonstrate to the magistrate factually why such a broad search
and seizure authority is reasonable. 9 2  The court noted that the officers'
supporting affidavits play a "critical role" in determining whether this
threshold has been met.
93
87 Id. at 1084.
88 Id. at 1089.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1090.
91 United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 979 (9th Cir. 2006).
92 Id. at 975.
93 Id. The content of the affidavit seems to be the critical factor in the eyes of the Ninth
Circuit. A few weeks earlier, it upheld a similarly broad warrant against an overbreadth
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Conversely, the Ninth Circuit did uphold the second part of Judge
Kozinski's opinion, adopting his analysis verbatim. 94  Judge Kozinski
rejected defendant's contention that the search of computer media should
have been limited to keywords or file extensions associated with child
pornography.95 Because such photographs can be hidden in all types of
files, he found the proposed search methodology to be unreasonable.96 He
likened the situation to forcing officers to ignore plastic bags which
contained a white powdery substance suspected of being cocaine simply
because they were labeled "flour" or "talcum powder., 97
Other courts have also rejected the use of rigid search protocols.98 In
United States v. Adjani, the Ninth Circuit refused to limit the government's
search of emails to specific email addresses or search terms.99 The court
reasoned that because file names can be easily disguised or renamed, the
government "should not be required to trust the suspect's self-labeling
when executing a warrant."' 00 Similarly, in United States v. Gray,'0 ' the
court approved the opening of picture files containing child pornography
during an unrelated search of defendant's computer for evidence pertaining
to his unauthorized access of a government computer. Even though
investigators did not anticipate finding relevant evidence in the image files,
the court approved their inclusion in the search. 0 2 It reasoned that an agent
conducting a search of a computer is entitled to examine "all files on the
computer" to determine whether they fall within the scope of the warrant.03
challenge in United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2006). In contrast to the
affidavit in Hill, the court noted that the supporting affidavit attached to the warrant
application contained "a detailed computer search protocol, including instructions as to when
computers should be searched on-site rather than taken off-site and procedures for screening
the data to determine what data could be searched and seized under the terms of the
warrant." Id. at 1149 n.7.
94 Hill, 459 F.3d at 968.
95 Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2dat 1088.
96 Id. at 1089.
97 Id. at 1090.
98 See United States v. Maali, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1245 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (holding that
"the lack of a detailed computer 'search strategy' does not render the warrant deficient as to
the search and seizure of computers"); United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211
F.R.D. 31, 47 (D. Conn. 2002) (holding that because computer searches are technical and
complex, they cannot be limited to precise, specific steps or only one permissible method);
Rosa v. Commonwealth, 628 S.E.2d 92, 96 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that "officers may
glance at files with various extensions in order to ascertain whether or not the files fall
within the purview of the warrant").
" 452 F.3d 1140, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2006).
'oo Id. at 1150.





The court likened the situation to the search of voluminous paper records or
files, which permits a cursory examination of all files to "determine whether
they fall into the category of those papers covered by the search warrant."'
0 4
Furthermore, despite testimony that it was possible to use the search
program to determine whether a file contained pictures or text without
opening it, the court concluded that it was "unreasonable" to force the
government to always use the most advanced search techniques.1
0 5
D. LIMITATIONS ON SEARCHES OF CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS
RECORDS
The search of business computers may require different rules,
however, because such searches implicate unique concerns. Business
computers may contain thousands of files and records of individuals or
entities unrelated to the target of the investigation. This is particularly true
of searches of innocent third parties, such as medical or law offices, which
are merely the repositories for the records relevant to the investigation. In
these situations, special attention needs to be paid by investigators so as to
not unnecessarily disturb privacy and confidentiality rights in the unrelated
records.
First, law enforcement officers should follow Department of Justice
("DOJ") regulations that dictate that agents should apply for search
warrants (in lieu of issuing subpoenas) only in exceptional circumstances. 0 6
Second, if a search warrant is necessary, officers should ensure that the
affidavit in support of it contains sufficient detail as to what particular files
and records are being sought to prevent irrelevant records from being swept
up in the search. Finally, special masters or taint teams should be used to
review confidential material before it is turned over to investigators. 0
7
1. Department of Justice Regulations
Pursuant to the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, the DOJ has issued
regulations aimed at protecting such privacy concerns. 0 8 The regulations
provide that no federal officer should apply for a search warrant to seize
documentary materials believed to be in the possession of "a disinterested
104 Id. at 528 (citing United States v. Kufrovich, 997 F. Supp. 246, 264 (D. Conn. 1997)).
'o' Id. at 530 n.8.
106 See 28 C.F.R. § 59.4 (1981) and discussion of this regulation infra Part II.D.1.
107 A taint team is composed of a different group of agents which is separate and apart
from the main group of investigators. The team reviews the seized material and separates
those documents which may be subject to privilege. It then turns over to the investigative
team only those documents it has determined to be nonprivileged. A "Chinese Wall" is then
erected between the taint team and the investigative team. See infra Part II.D.3.
108 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000aa- I1 (West 2004).
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third party" unless the use of less intrusive means of obtaining the
documents such as a subpoena would "substantially jeopardize" the
availability or usefulness of the information sought.'0 9 In determining
whether the use of such means would "substantially jeopardize" the
availability or usefulness of the materials, the investigator should consider,
among other factors, the likelihood of destruction of the material or the
immediacy of the government's need for it. " 0
A disinterested third party is defined as a person or organization "not
reasonably believed to be ... a suspect" in the criminal offense to which the
materials relate or "related by blood or marriage to such a suspect." '
Documentary materials include items such as audio and video tapes,
photographs, or materials upon which information is electronically or
magnetically recorded.1 2 The regulations also provide that search warrants
should not be executed on third-party law offices, medical offices, or
clergy, absent similar concerns."13 If a search of such persons or offices is
109 28 C.F.R. § 59.4.
110 Factors to consider whether the use of less intrusive means will "substantially
jeopardize" the availability or usefulness of the material include:
(1) Whether it appears the use of a subpoena or other alternative.., would be likely to result in
the destruction, alteration, concealment, or transfer of the materials sought; considerations,
among others, bearing on this issue may include:
(i) Whether a suspect has access to the materials sought;
(ii) Whether there is a close relationship of friendship, loyalty, or sympathy between the
possessor of the materials and a suspect;
(iii) Whether the possessor of the materials is under the domination or control of a suspect;
(iv) Whether the possessor of the materials has an interest in preventing the disclosure of the
materials to the government;
(2) The immediacy of the government's need to obtain the materials; considerations, among
others, bearing on this issue may include:
(i) Whether the immediate seizure of the materials is necessary to prevent injury to persons
or property;
(ii) Whether the prompt seizure of the materials is necessary to preserve their evidentiary
value;
(iii) Whether delay in obtaining the materials would significantly jeopardize an ongoing
investigation or prosecution ....
28 C.F.R. § 59.4(c).
. Id. § 59.2(b)-(b)(1).
11' Id. § 59.2(c).
113 Section 59.4(b)(4) provides that warrants should not be issued in such circumstances
unless:
(i) It appears that the use of a subpoena, summons, request or other less intrusive alternative
means of obtaining the materials would substantially jeopardize the availability or usefulness of
the materials sought;
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conducted, it should be executed in a manner so as to "minimize" scrutiny
of confidential materials.' 14 In addition, the regulations prohibit using a
challenge to a subpoena or other legal process as a "legitimate basis" for the
procurement of a search warrant."1 5 However, failure to comply with the
terms of these regulations is not an issue which may be litigated or form the
basis for the suppression or exclusion of evidence.'
1 16
Relatively few cases have explored the limitations these regulations
impose on searches of medical or law offices. In Klitzman, Klitzman, and
Gallagher v. Krut,117 the Third Circuit held that a search warrant, which
authorized the seizure of hundreds of files and most of a law firm's business
records, was overbroad in light of the fact that only one of the firm's
attorneys was a suspect. While finding that searches of law offices were not
per se unreasonable, the court chastised the government because it made no
attempt to limit the seizure of files to materials involving the fraudulent
scheme under investigation.1 8 Referencing the Privacy Protection Act and
the DOJ regulations, the court stated that the government should have
followed them instead of acting as if they were "nonexistent., ' 19 The court
suggested that in such situations a special master can be appointed to
review in camera any documents that a law firm objects to producing. 120
Conversely, where adequate protections are put in place to minimize
intrusions on privacy, courts have approved the seizure of records from
medical and legal offices. For example, in In re Impounded Case, the Third
Circuit did uphold the seizure of files and other documents from a law
firm. 12 ' The court distinguished Klitzman on the ground that the warrant
specified that only certain types of financial documents were to be seized.
It also found that any confidentiality concerns were "sufficiently protected"
(ii) Access to the documentary materials appears to be of substantial importance to the
investigation or prosecution for which they are sought; and
(iii) The application for the warrant has been approved as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this
section.
Id. § 59.2(b)(4).
114 Id. § 59.4 (b)(1).
115 Id. § 59.4(c)(2)
116 Id. § 59.6(b); see United States v. Marlinga, No. 04-80372, 2005 WL 465432 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 28, 2005).
117 744 F.2d 955, 961 (3d Cir. 1984).
118 Id. at 961.
"'9 Id. at 962.
120 Id.
121 In re Impounded Case (Law Firm) No. 875190, 840 F.2d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1988).
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by the procedures requiring the prosecution to seek further leave of court
before inspecting the files.'22
Florida courts have required that medical records of patients seized
during the execution of a search warrant be sealed pending notification of
the patients.123 In State v. Viatical Services, Inc., the court mandated that if
the medical records of innocent third parties are seized pursuant to a
warrant, the records must be sealed pending a post-seizure hearing on the
issue of the right to privacy. 1
24
2. Specificity of Warrants
In such situations where warrants are deemed to be necessary, the
warrant must specify what particular medical or legal records are sought.
For example, in United States v. Abrams,' 25 the First Circuit held that a
warrant, which permitted seizure of all of a doctor's Medicare records, was
void for lack of particularity because it failed to specify what time period
the warrant covered or what specific records were to be seized. The court
criticized investigators for failing to make any attempt to separate bona fide
records from fraudulent ones. 126 A division of the Pennsylvania Superior
Court reached a similar conclusion in Commonwealth v. Santner.12 7 There,
the officers seized 3600 files but only fifty were introduced as evidence at
trial.' 2 8 The court found that the officers could have narrowly tailored the
warrant because "they had an excellent idea of what specific information
they needed, and could easily have made the warrant much less broad."'' 2
9
3. The Use of Taint Teams to Protect Confidentiality
One somewhat controversial approach to the search of law firm has
been the utilization of "taint teams" in lieu of in camera review. 130 In
essence, attorneys and investigators not associated with the main
investigation conduct the search of the law office separate and independent
from the primary investigators and prosecutors.'13 The taint team reviews
the seized documents for privileged information and separates it from non-
122 Id. at 201-02.
123 State v. Rattray, 903 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 2005); State v. Viatical Servs.,
Inc., 741 So. 2d 560 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1999).
124 Viatical, 741 So. 2d at 564.
125 615 F.2d 541, 543 (1st Cir. 1980).
126 Id.
127 454 A.2d 24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
128 Id. at 28.
129 Id. at 30.
130 United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 841 n.14 (D.D.C. 1997).
131 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F.3d 511, 520 (6th Cir. 2006).
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privileged material. 32 The team returns privileged information to the law
office but turns over all other material to the investigation. 133 A "Chinese
Wall" is then erected between the taint team members and the primary
investigation and prosecution team.
134
In theory, the use of a taint team has some distinct advantages. It
relieves the trial court of much of the burden of sifting through the entire
record to look for privileged information. Instead, the court may only have
to review a few disputed documents for privilege. The obvious drawback to
this approach is that it exposes potentially confidential information to the
eyes of the taint team. It also relies heavily on the integrity of the personnel
involved not to breach the Chinese Wall.
For these reasons, court response has been equivocal to the use of taint
teams.1 35 In In re Search of 5444 Westheimer Road,136 a Southern District
of Texas court reasoned that the use of a taint team was a reasonable
accommodation to the problem of separating confidential information from
law office records. There, the FBI seized 118 boxes of information and
imaged four computer hard drives from a corporate office.' 37 The court
found that the use of a taint team would "sufficiently protect any potentially
privileged documents" and would allow for expeditious review of all seized
documents.1 38 It noted that its decision was based on the presumption that
government investigators will "conduct themselves with integrity.' 39
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. A Chinese Wall is essentially a self-imposed gag order. In theory, individuals on
the taint team and investigation team do not talk to one another regarding details of the case.
Such arrangements are often used to prevent attorneys transferring from one law firm to
another from talking about cases they had previously handled at their old firms.
135 See Hicks v. Bush, 452 F. Supp. 2d 88, 103 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding exigent
circumstances existed justifying use of taint team where government had legitimate interest
in quickly reviewing materials of suicidal prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay facility); In re
Search of 5444 Westheimer Road, H-06-238, 2006 WL 1881370, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 6,
2006) (finding use of taint team approved to sort privileged material from corporate files
seized pursuant to warrant). But see United States v. Stewart, 02CR396JGK, 2002 WL
1300059, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2002) (finding search of criminal defense attorney's
office raises Sixth Amendment concerns not present in the search of the offices of a civil
litigation attorney so the use of a Chinese Wall is "highly questionable" and should be
discouraged in the context of a criminal prosecution); In Re Search Warrant of Law Offices,
153 F.R.D. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting the use of taint teams in criminal prosecutions is
"highly questionable").
136 2006 WL 1881370, at *3.
117 Id. at *1.
138 Id. at *3.
139 Id. (quoting United States v. Grant, No. 04 CR 207BSJ, 2004 WL 1171258, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2004)).
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In contrast, in United States v. Neill,140 the District Court for the
District of Columbia heavily criticized the use of taint teams. While it
declined to hold that the government's invasion of the attorney-client
privilege rose to the level of a constitutional violation, it did find that the
government's interference with the privilege was intentional:
Where the government chooses to take matters into its own hands rather than using
the more traditional alternatives of submitting disputed documents under seal for in
camera review by a neutral and detached magistrate or by court-appointed special
masters (citations omitted), it bears the burden to rebut the presumption that taintedS 141
material was provided to the prosecution team.
However, while the court noted that the use of taint teams is "unwise" and
creates an "appearance of unfairness," it found their use does not offend the
Constitution absent a showing of harm resulting from disclosure of the
privileged information. 
142
The Sixth Circuit summed up the problems associated with taint teams
as follows:
[T]aint teams present inevitable, and reasonably foreseeable, risks to privilege, for
they have been implicated in the past in leaks of confidential information to
prosecutors. That is to say, the government taint team may also have an interest in
preserving the privilege, but it also possesses a conflicting interest in pursuing the
investigation, and, human nature being what it is, occasionally some taint team
attorneys will make mistakes or violate their ethical obligations. It is thus logical to
suppose that taint teams pose a serious risk to holders of the privilege, and this
supposition is supported by past experience.1
4 3
In particular, the court referenced an incident where a taint team turned over
tapes of attorney-client conversations, which were obviously protected by
attorney-client privilege, to members of the investigating team.' 44  The
court noted this incident highlights the obvious flaw in the taint team
procedure: "[T]he government's fox is left in charge of the appellants'
henhouse, and may err by neglect or malice, as well as by honest
differences of opinion.
145
Courts have distinguished the use of taint teams to review documents
produced under subpoena as opposed to those seized under exigent
circumstances such as a search warrant. In Neill, the court concluded that
where the government officials have already obtained possession of the
documents pursuant to a warrant, the use of a taint team to "sift the wheat
140 952 F. Supp. 834 (D.D.C. 1997).
141 Id. at 840-41.
142 Id. at 841 n.14.
143 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F.3d 511, 523 (6th Cir. 2006).




from the chaff' is "respectful of, rather than injurious to," the attorney-
client privilege. 4 6 In Hicks v. Bush, 147 the court held that the use of a taint
team was appropriate where the government was investigating the suicidal
deaths of three detainees. The court found that the government's legitimate
penological interests of maintaining inmate safety and thwarting prison
further disruption outweighed the relatively minor chilling effect on the
attorney-client privilege. 148 It concluded that no other alternative such as
magistrate review or the appointment of a special master could accomplish
the necessary review in a reasonable amount of time.1
49
Even where the use of taint teams has been approved, courts still
require the government to provide some procedure for review and challenge
of the non-privileged documents before they are turned over to prosecutors.
For example, in United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.,150 the court
doubted that (had it been challenged) the government's taint team procedure
would have been approved because it failed to provide notice to the
defendant of the taint team's privilege decisions or to afford it an
opportunity to challenge them in court before the documents were provided
to the prosecution team. Conversely, in approving the use of a taint team,
the Westheimer court pointed to the fact that the defendant would have an
opportunity to challenge the government's privilege determinations before
any material was turned over to the prosecution team. 151
E. RULE 4 1(G) MOTIONS FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY
Once the government has seized computer files and records pursuant
to a search warrant, the next question that must be answered is what
remedy, if any, the aggrieved party has to seek return of that information.
A party who alleges that property was unlawfully seized during execution
of a search warrant has two basic options. He may file a motion to suppress
the evidence (assuming it is incriminatory and being offered against him in
a criminal case), or he may move for its return. 152 An aggrieved party may
146 Id. at 522 (citing United States v. Abbell, 914 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Fla. 1995)).
147 Hicks v. Bush, 452 F. Supp. 2d 88, 103 (D.D.C. 2006).
148 Id.
149 Id.
SO United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1039 (D. Nev. 2006).
151 In re Search of 5444 Westheimer Road, H-06-238, 2006 WL 1881370, at *3 (S.D.
Tex. July 6, 2006).
152 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 (2006); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) (2006). Those individuals who
have not yet been charged with a crime or who are disinterested third parties (i.e., they are
not the target of the investigation) have only one option-seeking return of the property
pursuant to rule. As discussed below, in such a case the movant must demonstrate that
equitable principles favor him before such a motion will be heard.
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also seek return of lawfully seized property on the ground that he is being
unreasonably deprived of it. While Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure governs motions to suppress, Rule 41(g) provides for
motions for return of property as follows:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the
deprivation of property may move for the property's return. The motion must be filed
in the district where the property was seized. The court must receive evidence on any
factual issue necessary to decide the motion. If it grants the motion, the court must
return the property to the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect
access to the property and its use in later proceedings.
153
Many states have a similar provision. 54 A Rule 4 1(g) motion may be filed
either prior to indictment, or after charges have been filed, and it may be
filed independently of any pending criminal or civil case.
155
1. History of Rule 41
A brief examination of the history of Rule 41 is helpful to
understanding the intent behind the current rule and its practical operation.
The rule has been in existence in some form since the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1944. In 1972, the then-Rule 41(e)
was first amended. The Advisory Committee Comment to the 1972
Amendments noted that the rule "provides for return of the property if (1)
the person is entitled to lawful possession and (2) the seizure was illegal. " 156
The Rule was again substantially amended in 1989.157
The Advisory Committee Comments to that 1989 Amendment are
instructive. The primary purpose of that amendment was to address the
harm that may result from "the interference with the lawful use of property
by persons who are not suspected of wrongdoing."' 158 The Committee also
noted that the prior rule did not explicitly recognize the right of a property
owner to obtain return of lawfully seized property where the government
could protect its interests in the property through other means, such as
photocopying or conditioning return on future access. 59 Thus, the amended
153 The Rule was amended most recently in 2003. The amendments were cosmetic. The
Rule was re-lettered as 41(g), and the last sentence of the prior rule, regarding treatment of
post-indictment motions filed in the district of trial as motions to suppress, was deleted.
Rule 41(h) now encapsulates that sentence, however, providing that a defendant may move
to suppress evidence in the district of trial. See In re Search of Law Office, 341 F.3d 404,
408 n.3 (5th Cir. 2003).
154 See, e.g., COLO. R. CRIM. P. 4 1(e) (2006).
155 In re Search of Scranton Hous. Auth., 436 F. Supp. 2d 714, 718 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
156 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) advisory committee's comment, 1972 Amendment.
157 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee's comment (1989).




rule provided that "an aggrieved person may seek return of property that has
been unlawfully seized, and a person whose property has been lawfully
seized may seek return of property when aggrieved by the government's
continued possession of it.'
160
2. Pre-Indictment Motions to Return Property
Pre-indictment motions are to be treated as interlocutory in nature; in
other words, it is "really only a request for the modification in the terms of
the warrant which was issued by the magistrate judge in the first
instance."'' 61 Such motions are not intended to be dispositive matters and
are subject to further review if the government pursues criminal charges. 162
As a result, federal magistrate judges have jurisdiction to hear motions for
return of property, just as they have jurisdiction to issue the original search
warrant. 163 Where the movant sufficiently alleges facts which enable the
court to conclude that a substantial claim is presented, an evidentiary
hearing must be set. It is an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to
hold a hearing "if factual issues are sufficiently raised."'1
64
Pre-indictment motions for return of property are treated as civil
equitable proceedings and the court, therefore, must exercise "caution and
restraint" before assuming jurisdiction to hear them.' 65  In determining
whether to exercise equitable jurisdiction, courts must consider whether the
movant would suffer "irreparable injury" by deprivation of the property and
whether the movant has an "adequate remedy at law.', 166  Some circuits
require consideration of two additional factors: (1) whether the government
displayed a callous disregard for the constitutional rights of the movant; and
(2) whether the movant has an individual interest in and need for the seized
property. 1
67
Courts have declined to find irreparable injury, absent extraordinary
circumstances. Threat of imminent indictment does not demonstrate
160 Id.
161 In re Search of 4330 N. 35th St., 142 F.R.D. 161, 164 (E.D. Wis. 1992).
162 Id.
163 United States v. Douleh, 220 F.R.D. 391, 394 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).
164 In re the Search of the Scranton Hous. Auth., 436 F. Supp. 2d 714, 720 (M.D. Pa.
2006) (citing United States v. Albinson, 356 F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in
original).
165 In re Search of Kitty's East, 905 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1990).
166 Id. at 1371.
167 Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Search of 4801 Flyer
Ave., 879 F.2d 385, 390 (8th Cir. 1989); Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239, 1243 (5th Cir.
1975). Some jurisdictions have dropped the callous disregard requirement because proof of
illegality of the search is no longer required to bring a motion under Rule 41. Kitty's East,
905 F.2d at 1371.
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"irreparable harm" for purposes of a pre-indictment Rule 41(g) motion. 168
Such a threat would merely be an "ordinary injury" everyone has the chance
of suffering rather than an extraordinary one requiring equitable relief.
169
Courts have also held that the retention of original business documents does
not constitute irreparable injury if copies of the seized items are provided to
the business.170 They have held, however, that the irreparable injury test is
satisfied where the seizure impairs First Amendment free speech rights.
1 71
Courts are split whether an alleged invasion of the attorney-client privilege
is sufficient to satisfy this prong.
172
In order to satisfy the second prong (no adequate remedy at law), a
movant must show that he will not have a fair opportunity to subsequently
litigate the issue; the mere existence of a possible remedy is not sufficient to
deny equitable relief. 173 However, an adequate remedy will be found to
exist where criminal charges are imminently pending because the propriety
of the seizure can be challenged in a motion to suppress. 174  Where the
seized property is subject to a civil forfeiture action, an adequate remedy
will be found as well because the forfeiture action provides an opportunity
for the movant to be heard. 175  Conversely, no adequate remedy exists
where claimants are either innocent third parties who are not targets of the
investigation, or who were targets, but against whom charges are not
forthcoming.
168 Kitty's East, 905 F.2d at 1371. The Fifth Circuit used to hold to the contrary, but it
recently fell in line with other circuits, noting that the focus of an irreparable harm
determination should be on the loss suffered from deprivation of the property, not the fact of
the indictment. In re Search of Law Office, 341 F.3d 408, 415 (5th Cir. 2003).
169 In re Se. Equip. Co. Search Warrant, 746 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (S.D. Ga. 1990)
(citations omitted).
170 Ramsden, 2 F.3d at 326.
171 Kitty's East, 905 F.2d at 1371 (the seizure of x-rated videotapes constituted an
irreparable injury because free speech rights were directly infringed).
172 Law Office, 341 F.3d at 414; In re Search of 5444 Westheimer Rd., H-06-238, 2006
WL 1881370 (S.D. Tex. July 6, 2006). In Law Office, the government seized files and
records from an attorney's home and office. 341 F.3d at 407. The court found that the
defendant failed to prove it would suffer an irreparable injury because the warrant affidavit
provided that a "taint team" would seize the files subject to defendant's inspection for
potentially privileged documents. Id. The court noted that defendant failed to provide any
proof substantiating its allegations that the taint team viewed extensive amounts of
privileged information during the search. Id. at 414. But see In re Search of 636 South 66th
Terrace, 835 F. Supp. 1304, 1306 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding seizure of materials protected by
the attorney-client privilege gives rise to irreparable injury because confidentiality of the
materials may be lost if they are allowed to remain in the hands of investigators).
173 Interstate Cigar Co. v. United States, 928 F.2d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1991).
174 Angel-Tores v. United States, 712 F.2d 717, 718-19 (1st Cir. 1983).




In order to satisfy the third prong, some illegality in the search usually
must be found. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that the seizure of
evidence pursuant to a warrantless search, which is not justified by exigent
circumstances, constitutes callous disregard. 176 Another court declined to
find callous disregard, however, where the allegations were insufficient to
prove that the agent knowingly relied on false statements in submitting his
affidavit for a search warrant. 177 The final prong is satisfied where the
movant can demonstrate a pressing interest in or need for return of the
evidence such as where the seized documents are integral to the operation
of movant's business. 1
78
3. What Is the Proper Remedy Under Rule 41(g) ?
If the court does find that it should entertain the Rule 41 motion, then
it must determine what the proper remedy should be. While the Rule does
not contain a standard to help determine whether property should be
returned, the courts have noted that the spirit of Rule 41(g) is "one of
compromise." 179  The comments to the Rule state that "reasonableness
under all the circumstances" is the proper standard for determining the
outcome of such a motion.1 80  The Committee stated that where the
government has "a need for the property in an investigation or prosecution,"
retention of the property is "generally reasonable," but where its interest can
be satisfied by other means, retention would be "unreasonable."'' This
spirit of compromise is intended to avoid an all-or-nothing approach
whereby the government either is entitled to keep everything seized or
ordered to return everything, including copies. Thus, the Rule is intended
to allow room for return of documents that are relevant to ongoing or
contemplated investigations by permitting the government, in most
circumstances, to retain copies of the seized information for future use. 
182
176 Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1993).
177 Trezza v. United States, No. CV 06-492 TUC DCB, 2006 WL 2989033, at *2 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 16, 2006).
178 Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 967 F.2d 1237,
1240 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding landowner had interest in preservation of dinosaur fossil
seized during criminal investigation into violations of the Antiquities Act); In re Singh, 892
F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995) (ruling movant demonstrated such a pressing need where its
principal business was preparation of tax returns and IRS had seized business equipment and
business files); cf Hiller v. Murphy, 600 F. Supp. 14, 18 n.2 (D. Ga. 1984) (finding no
pressing need for property where movant filed for return of property two years after search
was executed and property was seized).
179 Ramsden, 2 F.3d at 327.
180 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) advisory committee's comment, 1989 Amendment.
181 Id.
182 In re Se. Equip. Co. Search Warrant, 746 F. Supp. 1563, 1574 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
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a. Suppression v. Return of Property
After the 1989 amendments, the Advisory Committee noted that "Rule
41(e) is not intended to deny the United States the use of evidence
permitted by the fourth amendment and federal statutes, even if the
evidence might have been unlawfully seized."'' 83 The Committee found it
significant that language in the prior version of the Rule, relating to the
suppression of returned property, had been deleted in response to Supreme
Court precedent which permitted the use of illegally seized evidence for
other purposes.184 In particular, in United States v. Calandra, the Supreme
Court held that the exclusionary rule could not be used to preclude grand
jury testimony based on illegally seized evidence. 85 As an extension of
that holding, the court noted that Rule 41(g) is not intended to be a
"statutory expansion of the exclusionary rule.' ' 186
In In re Southeastern Equipment Search Warrant, 87 the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia cautioned, however, that
Calandra should not be interpreted too broadly. It noted that Calandra
only addressed the issue of whether a witness could invoke the exclusionary
rule during grand jury questioning and did not address the issue of whether
illegally seized evidence could be returned while a grand jury proceeding
was underway. 188 Thus, the district court determined that "it is apparent
that the Court [in Calandra] did not intend to prohibit the use of a Rule
41(e) motion during a grand jury proceeding to seek the return of illegally
seized property." 
89
Since the 1989 amendment to the rule precluded suppression as a de
facto result of an order to return property, the district court reasoned that
Rule 41 provides for return of illegally seized property, while at the same
time reserving the determination of whether such evidence should be
excluded from trial under the exclusionary rule.' 90 Thus, a distinction needs
183 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) advisory committee's comment, 1989 Amendment.
184 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 930-31 (1984) (holding evidence
illegally seized but in good faith reliance on a facially valid warrant may be used in case-in-
chief); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974) (ruling exclusionary rule does
not prohibit grand jury from hearing testimony based on illegally seized evidence); Walder
v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 63-66 (1954) (finding illegally seized evidence may be used
for impeachment).
185 414 U.S. at 348-49.
186 Id. at 349 n.6.
187 746 F. Supp. 1563, 1574 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
188 Id. at 1571. In Calandra, the Supreme Court had left open the possibility that a party,
who was unable to seek suppression of the evidence under its ruling, could seek return of
property under Rule 41(e). 414 U.S. at 354 n.10.
189 Southeastern Equip. Co. Search Warrant, 746 F. Supp. at 1571 n.2.
190 Id. at 1571-72.
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to be made between suppression of evidence and the court's power to order
its return under Rule 41(g). Ordinarily, the court may only suppress
evidence pursuant to a Rule 41(g) motion if it treats the motion as a post-
indictment motion to suppress under Rule 12.191 In the context of a motion
to suppress, the general rule is that properly seized evidence will remain
admissible and only that which is improperly seized will be suppressed.
92
Conversely, blanket suppression of evidence is warranted where the agents
executing the warrant exhibit "flagrant disregard" for the terms of the
warrant.193  Such conduct is found where the government effects a
"widespread seizure" of items which clearly are not within the scope of the
warrant.1
9 4
Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the target of a grand jury
investigation could not use Rule 41(g) to "prevent the grand jury from
having access to illegally obtained evidence." 195 This ruling is essentially a
recognition of the fact that the exclusionary rule only applies to the
prosecution's case-in-chief; illegally seized evidence can be used in other
contexts, including for impeachment, sentencing, and before the grand jury.
An order for return of property that also had the effect of suppression would
therefore be premature at this stage of the proceedings because the court
cannot predict what the government's intended use of the property is going
to be. As the Fifth Circuit pointed out in In re Search of Law Office, the
only exception to this rule is where complete suppression of all seized
evidence is warranted upon a "substantial showing of irreparable harm." 1
96
Return of the property and suppression of its use for any purpose are proper
in such a situation because the court would likely order blanket suppression
of the evidence for use at trial anyway.
b. The Government's Retention of Copies of Returned Property
Another question that arises in the context of a Rule 41 motion is
whether the government should be permitted to retain a copy of seized
materials where the original documents are ordered to be returned (or vice
versa). This issue is a particularly thorny one. The Advisory Committee
comments are again instructive. The Committee specifically rejected the
idea that the government has to return photocopies of business records it
has lawfully seized and intimated that copies of illegally seized evidence
191 FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 1(h).
192 United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 60 (D. Conn. 2002)
(quoting United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 556 (4th Cir. 2000)).
193 United States v. Hamie, 165 F.3d 80, 83-84 (1st Cir. 1999).
194 Triumph Capital, 211 F.R.D. at 61.
195 In re Search of Law Office, 341 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 2003).
196 Id. at 413-14.
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could be retained in certain circumstances as well. 197 The Committee noted
that the return or destruction of all copies of seized records is warranted
only where "equitable considerations" justify such an approach. 198
Courts have generally held that the government may retain copies of
the seized evidence, absent "extreme circumstances."'' 99 For example, in
Ramsden, the Ninth Circuit approved the government's retention of copies
of documents seized without a valid warrant because it advanced a
"legitimate law enforcement interest"-namely that of assisting the British
government with an ongoing investigation of the defendant.2 °° On similar
grounds, the Fifth Circuit refused to uphold a district court order requiring
return of all copies of documents taken from a law office. 20 1 The court
noted that the Advisory Committee comments caution that "even in cases of
illegally seized property, '[i]f the United States has a need for the property
in an investigation... its retention of the property generally is
reasonable.'
20 2
Taken at face value, this statement implies that the government could
keep copies of any documents and records that it seizes, regardless of the
legality of their seizure, simply by alleging that it has some "legitimate
interest" in their retention. While it is true that Rule 41(g) cannot expand
the scope of the exclusionary rule, it is axiomatic that it cannot restrict it
either. A more narrow definition of "legitimate government interest" is
needed to prevent such a perverted result.
In order to retain items seized outside the scope of a warrant, the
government must demonstrate that the items have some connection or
nexus to the underlying investigation. To hold otherwise would eliminate
197 The Committee summed up its findings as follows:
As amended, Rule 41(e) avoids an all or nothing approach whereby the government must either
return records and make no copies or keep originals notwithstanding the hardship to their owner.
The amended rule recognizes that reasonable accommodations might protect both the law
enforcement interests of the United States and the property rights of property owners and
holders. In many instances documents and records that are relevant to ongoing or contemplated
investigations and prosecutions may be returned to their owner as long as the government
preserves a copy for future use.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) advisory committee's comment, 1989 Amendment.
198 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) advisory committee's comment, 1989 Amendment. The
Committee cited to Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 867-69 (3d Cir. 1975) as an example of
such extenuating circumstances. This citation is vague and, frankly, confusing. Paton dealt
with an expungement of a closed criminal case, not a Rule 41(e) motion. Id. at 867. The
Ninth Circuit found the citation unhelpful as well. Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 322,
327 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993).
199 Grimes v. Comm'r, 82 F.3d 286, 291 (9th Cir. 1996).
200 2 F.3d at 327.




any incentive for the government to refrain from engaging in widespread
fishing expeditions. For example, assume the government has a warrant to
search a house for evidence of stolen property. During the search, the
government seizes stolen electronics (related to the investigation) and
evidence of an assault (unrelated to the investigation) from a location not
authorized by the warrant. Under this analysis of the rule, while both types
of evidence are illegally seized, the government would be able to retain the
stolen electronics but not the evidence related to the assault.
Several courts have limited the language of Rule 41(g) in this fashion.
In Interstate Cigar Co. v. United States, the Seventh Circuit held that in
order to retain possession of seized property, the government "must
demonstrate a specific nexus between the seized property and the
continuing criminal investigation., 20 3 Similarly, the court in In re Search
Warrant for K-Sports Imports, Inc. refused to extend the government's right
to retain documents and property which were unrelated to the topic of the
204warrant. There, customs agents seized illegal Chinese machine guns,
records, and other documents pertaining to their purchase, as well as other
unrelated weapons, records, and computer data.2 °5 The court held that the
government could only retain items related to illegal machine gun purchase:
Government, in this case, has a legitimate interest in documents and computer
records/discs related to the purported machine guns because of the pending forfeiture
proceeding; but does not have a legitimate interest regarding documents and computer
records/discs unrelated to the purported machine guns. Government's interest may be
accommodated by returning all original documents and computer records/discs to K-
Sports after Government has had an opportunity to review them and to photocopy or
otherwise duplicate those items relating to the purported machine guns. This
resolution achieves the "reasonable accommodation" favored by the Ninth Circuit.
2 06
Finally, in Maali, the court refused to permit the government to keep all of
the information found on eighty-three hard drives containing some three
million files it had seized during the search of a business.0 7  The
government had sought to keep all of the documents, claiming that they
were part of a separate, on-going grand jury investigation.0 8 The court held
that the government could not keep documents which were not "within the
scope of the warrant" and which it "did not intend to introduce at trial. 20 9
203 928 F.2d 221, 224 (7th Cir. 1991).
204 163 F.R.D. 594, 597 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
205 Id. at 596.
206 Id. at 598 (emphasis added).
207 United States v. Maali, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1264 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
200 Id. at 1266.
209 Id.
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III. DISCUSSION OF UNITED STATES V. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING, INC.
The CDT decision is important in the law of computer searches
because it addresses most of the areas touched on above. Unlike many
cases which only involve the search of a defendant's personal computer, the
CDT case implicates wide-ranging privacy concerns, involving the search
of third-party medical records. The following is an in-depth analysis of the
decision and its potential to influence future decisions in this area.
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In CDT, the federal government served the search warrants in question
as part of an ongoing investigation into the activities of BALCO. 2'0 The
government began its investigation in 2002 and eventually developed
probable cause that at least ten major league baseball players had obtained
steroids from BALCO.211 Shortly thereafter, the Major League Baseball
Players Association ("MLBPA") agreed that, as part of its collective
bargaining agreement with MLB, the players would be anonymously tested
for steroid use in 2003.212 Pursuant to the agreement, the results would be
used only to determine the extent of the steroid problem in baseball and the
results of the tests would be kept confidential.213
The government in early 2004 then subpoenaed the testing records for
all MLB players from the independent testing labs which had performed the
tests-Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. ("CDT") in Long Beach,
California and Quest Diagnostics, Inc. ("Quest") in Las Vegas, Nevada.214
CDT and Quest both resisted producing any material under the subpoenas.
On March 3, 2004, the government issued new subpoenas, seeking
information related only to the ten players with BALCO connections.215
The MLBPA filed motions to quash the subpoenas. While the motions to
210 473 F.3d 915, 919-20 (9th Cir. 2006).
211 Id. at 920.
212 Id. at 944-45 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213 In 2003, 1198 MLB players were tested for steroids pursuant to the new collective
bargaining agreement that had gone into effect the previous fall. Two hundred forty players
were randomly selected for a second round of tests. Gordon Edes, Baseball Gets Tougher
over Steroid Use, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 2003, available at http://www.boston.com/
sportsIbaseball/articles/2003/11/14/baseball-gets-tougherover steroiduse/. Pursuant to
the agreement, the identities of those who tested positive an initial time were to be kept
confidential. Id. The league announced that 5-7% of the 1438 anonymous, unannounced
tests had tested positive for steroids, triggering a new round of testing and sanctions for
2004. Id.
214 CDT, 473 F.3d at 920. After the initial subpoena was met with resistance, the
government then issued a narrower subpoena on March 3, 2004, limited to the testing




quash were still pending, the government applied for warrants to search the
two labs in the federal districts where they were located.216 The warrants
authorized the seizure of the drug testing records and specimens for the ten
named players connected to the BALCO investigation as well as any other
materials detailing and explaining the testing process. i7 The warrants also
authorized the agents to search computer equipment and storage devices,
and where an on-site search would be impracticable, to seize either a copy
of the data or the computer equipment itself.2 8 Additionally, the warrant
allowed the agents to rely on the advice of a computer expert to choose the
proper course of action to capture the data sought.21 9
The warrants were executed on April 8, 2004.220 Initially, the agents'
search of CDT was met with resistance. 22' The agents threatened to seize
all of CDT's computers for up to sixty days unless the directors assisted
them in locating the evidence.222 After lengthy negotiations with CDT
directors and their counsel, the federal agents were informed that two
particular computers contained the information relevant to the search
223warrant. During the search, agents discovered a hard copy document
which contained names and identifying numbers for all MLB players,
including some of the ten BALCO players.224 One of the agents faxed the
document to another agent for preparation of a third search warrant to seize
testing specimen samples from Quest based on the identifying numbers.225
After observing the agent fax the document, one of CDT's directors
opened a locked drawer and provided the agent with a document that
contained the testing results for the ten named BALCO players.226 Another
CDT director then identified a computer directory (the "Tracey" directory)
216 Id. at 921. The affidavit for the warrant for CDT referenced the fact that CDT
intended to challenge the subpoena. Id. at 946. The affidavit for the warrant to search Quest
apparently did not reference the fact a subpoena had been issued or that a motion to quash
had been filed. Id. at 947 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
217 Id. at 921.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 921-22.




225 Id. The agents who executed the initial search warrant at Quest's Las Vegas lab were
unable to locate the specimens to be seized because the samples were identified by number
only and the identifying numbers were kept at an off-site location. Pursuant to the third
warrant, the agents seized the then-identifiable BALCO players' specimens. Id. at 922 n. 13.
The MLBPA's motion for return of property was based solely on the conduct of the agents
during their search of CDT, however. Id. at 923.
226 id.
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for the agents which contained all of the computer files for the company's
sports drug testing programs.227  A forensic computer expert then
recommended copying of the entire directory for off-site analysis due to the
time and intrusiveness involved in searching the entire directory on site.228
A copy of the directory was then made and seized for analysis. 229 Agents
seized additional hard copy documents, including a twenty-five page master
list of all MLB players tested during the 2003 season and a thirty-four page
list of positive drug testing results for eight of the ten BALCO players,
which was intermingled with positive test results for twenty-six other
players.23 °
On April 30, 2004, the government sought a search warrant in the
Northern District of California for all electronic data retained by CDT
pertaining to the drug testing of all MLB players located within the Tracey
directory, a copy of which was in the possession of the IRS in San Jose,
California.231 The affidavit sought authorization to conduct a "thorough
review" of all the MLB-related drug testing data and to seize "all data
pertaining to illegal drug use by any member of major league baseball. 232
The affidavit also averred that it was "logical to assume" that such a review
would "provide additional evidence of the use of similar performance-
enhancing drugs which could establish a link to the charged defendants in
the charged [BALCO] case. 233  The affidavit for the warrant did not
disclose the ongoing litigation surrounding the seizure of the same material
from the CDT lab on April 7th.234
On May 5, 2004, the agents applied for new search warrants of CDT
and Quest based on the information obtained from the Tracey directory
seized from CDT. 235 The new warrants authorized seizure of all specimens
and records relating to all of the other non-BALCO MLB players who had
227 Id. at 947 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The directory
contained over 2900 files. Certain subdirectories pertained to the MLB drug test results;
many others contained test results for other sports and business organizations. Id.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 923 (majority opinion).
230 Id. Copies of all seized documents were provided to CDT directors several days later.
Id. at 923 n. 15.
231 Id. at 923 n.16.
232 Id. at 948 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233 Id.
234 Id. at 949. A motion for return of property was subsequently filed and granted by
Judge Illston on August 9, 2004. The government did not challenge the ruling, but instead
asserted that it had the right to review the same information under the April 7 warrants. Id.
at 923 n. 16 (majority opinion).
235 Id. at 923-24.
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tested positive for steroids in 2003.236 The government executed the
warrants a day later and simultaneously issued grand jury subpoenas for the
237
same information. The MLBPA then filed Rule 41(g) motions for return
of property seized pursuant to both the April and May warrants.238 It also
filed motions to quash the May subpoenas. 239 Without holding evidentiary
hearings, the trial courts in each district granted the motions for return of
property. 240 The courts ordered that all property seized which was not
connected to the ten BALCO players must be returned.241 Judge Illston also
issued an order quashing the May 6, 2004 subpoena directed at CDT.242
B. NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION
The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the trial courts to grant the
motions for return of property and to quash the subpoenas, finding that their
decisions constituted an abuse of discretion.243 The court reviewed the
Ramsden factors for determining whether an exercise of the court's
equitable power to entertain a pre-indictment motion for return of property
was justified.244 Although it ultimately ruled that the equities weighed in
the MLBPA's favor, the panel held that the lower courts had erred in
finding that the government's execution of the warrants evidenced a
"callous disregard" for the players' constitutional rights. 245
1. The Lower Courts' Findings That Issuance of the Search Warrants
Constituted Callous Disregard Were Erroneous
a. The Simultaneous Issuance of Subpoenas and Search Warrants Did Not
Constitute Callous Disregard
First, the court rejected the players' argument that the government's
simultaneous issuance of search warrants and subpoenas for the same
information constituted "callous disregard," stating "[w]e are aware of no
236 id.
237 Id. at 924. Quest complied with the subpoena, but the government deferred CDT's
compliance until the search warrant litigation was resolved. On August 31, 2004, the
government revoked the indefinite deferral and the MLBPA filed a motion to quash in the
Central District of California on September 13, 2004. Id. at 925.
238 Id. at 924.
239 Id. at 925.
240 Id. at 924.
241 id.
242 Id. at 925.
243 Id. at 938.
244 Id. at 929-36.
245 Id. at 936.
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authority that the simultaneous pursuit of search warrants and subpoenas in
aid of an ongoing grand jury investigation constitutes a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. ''246 The court recognized the difference between the
two tools, noting that warrants may only be obtained upon a showing of
probable cause, whereas subpoenas may be issued any time a prosecutor
feels the information may assist a grand jury with its investigation.247 Thus,
it concluded that even had the initial subpoenas been quashed, the
government still could have applied for search warrants to obtain the
requested material.248
This conclusion goes counter to the DOJ guidelines which state that
search warrants should not be issued in lieu of subpoenas (where practical),
or issued where a challenge to the use of a subpoena has been made.249
Although Judge Thomas raised this issue in his dissent,25° the majority
dismissed his argument on the ground that such guidelines do not give rise
to substantive rights, and as such, do not dictate what is "reasonable" under
the Fourth Amendment.251 Judge Thomas noted that such guidelines do,
however, "form a baseline from which to judge the reasonableness of
unjustified deviations from the standard practices they outline., 252
Judge Thomas' reasoning is more persuasive. While it is true that such
guidelines should not be used to delineate the floor for determining which
procedures are, at a minimum, constitutionally required, the trial courts
were not using the government's deviation to prove defendant's
constitutional Fourth Amendment rights had been violated (and thus to
order suppression of evidence). Rather, they were using it to determine
whether the court's equitable powers should be exercised to entertain a Rule
4 1 (g) motion for return of property.
For example, in the lower court's ruling on the Motion for Return of
Property in the Central District of California, Judge Cooper noted some
"special concerns" that she had with the government's actions in this case:
The documents presented to the Court in connection with this Motion reveal
extremely troubling conduct on the part of the Government. The picture painted is
one of almost desperate effort to acquire evidence by whatever means could be
utilized. The Government negotiated with movants' attorneys over the breadth of the
grand jury subpoenas; received assurances in writing that the records of the ten
athletes would be secured while the Court resolved the issue, and the day after the
246 Id. at 930.
247 Id.
248 id.
249 See discussion of 28 C.F.R. § 59.4 supra notes 107-15.
250 CDT, 473 F.3d at 959 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251 Id. at 938 n.42 (majority opinion).
252 Id. at 959 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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issue was presented to a Court, went to another district and sought a search
warrant.... Four days after Movants filed a motion before Magistrate Judge Johnson
for return of property, the Government obtained a further warrant from a Magistrate
Judge in the Northern District of California. And while a motion for return of that
property was pending, the Government obtained two more warrants in the Central
District of California (not from Magistrate Judge Johnson) and in Nevada. The image
of quickly and skillfully moving the cu so no one can find the pea would be
humorous if the matter were not so serious.
Thus, in his dissent, Judge Thomas concluded that the district judges were
entitled to find that the government's simultaneous issuance of subpoenas
and search warrants constituted callous disregard because it "undertook this
action in an attempt to prevent the Players Association and CDT from
litigating the merits of their objections to the grand jury subpoenas., 254
b. The Warrants Were Not Used as a Pretext to Search for Evidence of
Unrelated Crimes
The MLBPA had also argued that the government was using the
warrants (aimed at the BALCO test results) as a pretext to obtain the
records of the other non-BALCO players who had also tested positive for
steroids.255 It attempted to analogize the facts of its case to United States v.
Rettig, where the Ninth Circuit had suppressed evidence seized as a result
of "egregious police misconduct. 2 56  There, the police had obtained a
warrant to search a house for marijuana paraphernalia a day after failing to
obtain a warrant to search it for evidence of a cocaine-smuggling
conspiracy.25 7 During the subsequent search of the home, the officers
demanded that the suspect's wife "tell us where [the cocaine] is so we don't
have to mess up your house. 255
259The CDT court properly rejected that comparison. Since the agents
were lawfully on the property and were authorized to seize records of the
ten BALCO players, the court found that the seizure of the records of the
non-BALCO players was not improper simply because they happened to be
253 Id. at 953-54 (quoting Judge Cooper's October 1, 2004 order granting the motion for
return of property) (emphasis in original). The image Judge Cooper describes is perhaps
even more humorous given her pun in the context of a drug testing case.
254 Id. at 959-60.
255 Id. at 932 (majority opinion).
256 id.
257 United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 422-23 (9th Cir. 1978).
258 Id. at 422 n. 1.
259 The MLBPA did not challenge the validity of the warrants so the court presumed
there was probable cause to support issuance of the warrants. CDT, 473 F.3d at 929.
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intermingled with the relevant records. 260 "Because the agents saw that the
spreadsheet clearly contained information within the scope of the warrant,
they seized the spreadsheet for off-site review." 261 The court also noted that
the record contained no evidence that the agents specifically targeted and
seized records unrelated to the subject of the warrant.262
The real problem, as Judge Thomas pointed out in his dissent, was that
the government took no steps to protect the confidentiality of the non-
BALCO players' records. CDT had offered to produce the requested files,
subject to their review by a magistrate for segregation of the non-
confidential material. This procedure was rejected by the government.
Instead, the government seized the entire Tracey directory, examined it, and
then sought additional search warrants for the material it had initially
requested in the much broader February subpoenas. 63 The government
should have, at the very least, used a taint team to segregate the confidential
material.
c. The Seizure of Intermingled Records Did Not Constitute Callous
Disregard
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit rejected the MLBPA's contention that
the government's seizure of intermingled documents without providing
procedures for judicial review evidenced callous disregard. The court
reviewed two prior precedents involving intermingled documents and
concluded that the agents in this instance had not violated the Fourth
Amendment. 264 In United States v. Beusch, the court upheld the seizure of
ledgers which contained items both covered and not covered by the
warrant. 65 The court concluded that no Fourth Amendment violation
occurs where "single files and single ledgers, i.e., single items which,
though theoretically separable, in fact constitute one volume or file
260 The government argued that the seizure of the records was justified by the plain view
doctrine. The court did not reach this argument, holding instead that the seized material fell
within the scope of the search warrants. Id. at 935 n.39. In essence, the court's rationale
was that since the government intended to use only those records which pertained to positive
steroid tests of MLB players, they fell within the scope of the warrants. However, the
government was entitled to use only information relating to the ten BALCO players under
the warrants. Id. at 937.
261 Id. at 932.
262 As discussed previously, it was not until the agents had reviewed the contents of the
Tracey directory that they expanded the scope of the warrant to include all 100-plus players
who had tested positive. See supra Part IlI.A.
263 Id. at 962 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
264 Id. at 932-33. The court discussed United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.
1982), and United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1979). CDT, 473 F.3d at 932-33.
265 596 F.2d at 876-77.
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folder., 266  Conversely, the Tamura court objected to the "wholesale
seizure" of entire filing cabinets of records without making any efforts to
limit the seizure of unrelated material.267
The CDT court found the situation more similar to Beusch, noting that,
unlike in Tamura, the agents did not remove "entire categories of
documents to coerce employees into cooperation," but instead only
removed files and data related to the BALCO investigation.268 "Their
ultimate decision to remove a relevant number of files for off-site review
stemmed not from disregard of privacy rights, but from sensitivity to the
ongoing disruption caused by the search to CDT-an innocent third party in
the underlying investigation., 269 The court noted the agents took "only a
limited set of clearly relevant disks and a copy of the Tracey directory" and
provided copies of all material taken just eight days later. The court
concluded that the "agents demonstrated the careful regard absent in
Tamura."
270
Again, the majority's analysis misses the point. The fact that the
agents seized a copy of the Tracey directory rather than the entire computer
is really not relevant in this instance. While the seizure of a copy is
certainly less disruptive to the operation of CDT's business, the more
pertinent concern is whether the government's actions interfered with
privacy rights of the non-BALCO related players whose records were
contained on the directory. Judge Thomas correctly stated that "when the
countervailing interest is privacy and not merely the disruption of business,
that interest suffers whether it is copies or originals that are seized., 271
The court also refused to require that a second warrant be obtained
before government agents could review the intermingled records. In so
holding, it declined to apply the Tamura court's suggestion that the seized
intermingled documents should be sealed and held pending approval by a
magistrate of a further search, labeling such a requirement as "advisory
266 Id. at 877.
267 694 F.2d at 595.
268 CDT, 473 F.3d at 934. Apparently the court considered all of the sports drug testing
information in CDT's possession as being related to the BALCO investigation. The Tracey
directory contained information on thirteen different sports organizations, not just MLB.
269 Id. To assign such noble motives to the agents in the CDT case ignores one small
detail. The government here did exactly what the agents did in Tamura-they threatened to
take all sixteen of CDT's computers unless the employees cooperated in helping locate the
relevant records. Id. at 922. Faced with a complete shutdown of their business, the CDT
directors begrudgingly complied with some of the agents' requests. Id. It seems
disingenuous to reward the officers' conduct in this case simply because their threats were
more successful in eliciting cooperation than those made in Tamura.
270 Id. at 934-35.
271 Id. at 963 n.9 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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dicta. 272 Instead, the court focused on the Tamura court's allowance for
substitute procedures pursuant to which "all items in a set of files" may be
inspected during a search if such procedures are spelled out in the initial
warrant.273 The court approved the seizure of the Tracey drive and other
intermingled records because the agents had followed the protocol laid out
in the search warrant for seizing intermingled records and data.
274
However, the court failed to address whether the warrant or affidavit
had established a threshold showing for the need to remove the computer
hardware and intermingled files in the first place. Recall that another Ninth
Circuit panel had recently held, just prior to the CDT decision, that more
than a "conclusory allegation" is necessary to permit the wholesale removal
of computer hardware and storage media from a search site.275
272 Id. at 933 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090
(C.D. Cal. 2004)). This conclusion stems from the fact that the Tamura court found the
wholesale seizure of documents to be unreasonable in light of feasible alternatives which
existed to sort the documents on site. Thus, the court's suggestion of how to handle future
cases where such on-site sorting was not feasible was dicta.
273 Id. (citing United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1982)).
274 Id. at 933-34. The search warrants provided:
Upon searching the premises, law enforcement personnel trained in searching and seizing
computer data (the "computer personnel") ... make an initial review of any computer equipment
and storage devices to determine whether these items can be searched on-site in a reasonable
amount of time and without jeopardizing the ability to preserve the data .... If the computer
personnel determine that it is not practical to perform an on-site search or make an on-site copy
of the data within a reasonable amount of time, then the computer equipment and storage devices
will be seized and transported to an appropriate law enforcement laboratory for review.
Id.
275 Hill, 459 F.3d at 975; see discussion supra Part II.C. It is difficult to tell whether the
CDT court concluded that the procedures laid out in the warrant for seizure of computer files
and equipment satisfied the Hill requirement, or whether it simply chose to ignore it
altogether. The omission is probably academic, however. Although the affidavit remains
under seal, the portions of it reprinted in the opinion indicate that the government did justify
removal in the affidavit on the ground that:
The volume of data sorted on many computer systems and storage devices will typically be so
large that it will be highly impractical to search for data during the execution of the physical
search of the premises .... Searching computer systems is a highly technical process which
requires specific expertise and specialized equipment. There are so many types of computer
hardware and software in use today that it is impractical to bring to the search site all of the
necessary technical manuals and specialized equipment to conduct a thorough search. In
addition, it may be necessary to consult with computer personnel who have specific expertise in
the type of computer software application or operating system that is being searched.
CDT, 473 F.3d at 966 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, it
could certainly be argued that this language is mere boilerplate which is put in all warrant
affidavits rather than a specific showing of probable cause.
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d. The Government Did Not Have to Limit Its Search of the CDT Computer
Files to Keywords
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the government should
have limited its search of the computer directory to keyword searches such
as the names of the BALCO players. The court pointed out that the agents
were not required to assume that all relevant documents were so
conveniently named or that CDT had no incentive to avoid providing the
requested documents.276 The dissent suggested that the use of a relational
database program would have easily segregated the data since the test
results were kept by player name or identifying number.277 Rather than
relying on CDT officials to conduct the search, the dissent further noted that
the preferred procedure is to have a magistrate supervise the segregation
and management of the data.278
The majority refused to limit computer searches in such a fashion. It
pointed out that the test results at Quest were not saved by keyword at all,
but instead were saved by number; the corresponding key was kept at a
storage locker at a different facility.2 79 Thus, the court concluded the
agents' actions were not performed in bad faith:
The government's decision to copy the entire directory represented a conscientious
effort to seek out all the evidence covered by the search warrant. We do not discern
bad faith or "callous disregard" simply because the agents determined, after an initial
review, that certain intermingled files needed to be reviewed off site, as permitted
under our applicable precedents and the warrant itself.
280
According to the court, the agents' seizure of the intermingled files
"displayed attentiveness both to the warrant's precautionary procedures and
to the importance of avoiding unnecessary disruption of CDT's business
,,281
operations.
2. The Remaining Three Ramsden Factors Weighed in Favor of the MLBPA
As previously mentioned, while the court concluded that the first
Ramsden factor weighed against invocation of the district court's equitable
power (and the district courts' conclusions to the contrary were thus
erroneous), it found that the other three factors weighed in favor of the
276 CDT, 472 F.3d at 935.
277 Id. at 975-76 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
278 Id. at 976 n. 19.
279 Id. at 935 (majority opinion).
280 Id.
281 Id. at 936.
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MLBPA.282 Therefore, it held that the district courts did not abuse their
discretion in entertaining, at the outset, the motions for return of property.
However, the Ninth Circuit went on to hold that the district courts'
orders, granting the motions and requiring return of the seized evidence
unrelated to the ten BALCO players, were erroneous.283
3. Return of Property Was Not Warranted Under Rule 41(g)
The court found that Rule 41(g) motions are properly denied if the
government has a continuing need for the property as evidence, noting that
return is proper only when the government "no longer needs the
5)284property. The court reasoned return of the property was unwarranted
because the intermingled files and data were seized legally under the search
warrant and the government stated the remaining evidence was "essential"
to its investigation and prosecution of illegal steroid distribution.285
a. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Determine Whether the Non-BALCO Files
Were Lawfully Seized Under the Warrant and Were Relevant to the
Investigation
This analysis provides only half of the picture. Before the court can
examine the government's continuing need for the evidence, it must first
determine whether the evidence was lawfully seized under the warrant and
whether it is relevant to the investigation described in the warrant.286 With
regard to intermingled data, the CDT court's analysis failed to distinguish
between the lawfulness of the seizure of the intermingled property in toto
and the lawfulness of its continued retention and search of each individual
computer file. 287 The court simply bootstrapped its assumption that the test
results for the non-BALCO players could be retained to its finding that the
computer data as a whole had been properly seized under the intermingled
records doctrine. Instead, the court should have first asked whether the
government had proven that the seizure of the positive test results for the
other hundred MLB players had been authorized under the April 2004
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 937 (emphasis in original).
285 Id.
286 See discussion of Rule 41 motions supra Part II.E.
287 For example, suppose the government seized a laptop and computer bag while
searching for evidence of a drug manufacturing ring. While the seizure of the laptop bag
may be justified under the intermingled property doctrine, the government could not keep
unrelated evidence in the bag such as personal photos, credit cards, etc., simply on the
ground the laptop bag was lawfully seized. That evidence is irrelevant to the investigation
and clearly exceeds the scope of the original warrant. Thus, it must be returned.
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warrants (or as an exception to the warrant requirement). It clearly was not.
The warrants only provided for the seizure of the test results for the ten
288BALCO players. Moreover, the government conceded that before it
reviewed the Tracey directory, it did not have probable cause to issue
search warrants for the data from the non-BALCO players.289
Even acknowledging that the Rule permits the government to retain
unlawfully seized evidence in some circumstances, the government must
still show that such evidence is relevant to the investigation at hand. The
Ninth Circuit seemed to ignore other cases like K-Sports, where the court
forced the government to return unrelated property. 290 The Rule is designed
to permit the government to use illegally seized evidence only for closely
related purposes (such as impeachment), not to permit it to expand its
investigation into unrelated matters.
In this instance, some of the seized material concerned obviously
unrelated testing records. The Tracey directory contained over 2900 files,
including test results from thirteen different sports. The government
admitted, in a hearing before Judge Illston in the trial court, that it could
theoretically launch independent investigations of other sports based on the
information contained in the Tracey directory:
Court: What if hockey had a subdirectory that had positive results and he [Agent
Novitsky] clicked on it to make sure it was what it said it was, by George, that's what
it was, what about that?
Counsel: If it did happen, I would think that theoretically Agent Novitsky would have
the right to either request a search warrant .... So there might be a legal entitlement
for Agent Novitsky to use that and do something with it.... [A]gain, you would
have, I believe, probable cause to believe that evidence in there would lead to other
persons potentially involved in disputable criminal drugs, which is the crime that's
. • .. .. 291
under investigation.
The government's interpretation of the law as ratified by the Ninth Circuit
would, in essence, authorize the issuance of general warrants.
b. The Ninth Circuit Improperly Relied on Precedent Concerning Blanket
Suppression
The CDT court compounded its error by comparing the facts of its case
to those of other cases where blanket suppression was found to be
unwarranted. It cited Ramsden and Tamura for the proposition that full
288 CDT, 473 F.3d at 921.
289 Id. at 962 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
290 In re Search Warrant for K-Sports Imports, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 594, 597 (C.D. Cal.
1995).
291 CDT, 473 F.3d at 964 n. 10 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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suppression of evidence was not warranted, even where the officers had
engaged in an improper, wholesale seizure of evidence.292 The court noted
that the Tamura court found return of the seized property "inappropriate,"
even though some of the evidence had been unlawfully taken.293
Ramsden and Tamura are inapposite. While the court correctly stated
that blanket suppression is warranted only upon a showing of a "particularly
egregious violation," this statement is applicable only if the MLBPA was
moving for blanket suppression.294 Unlike the defendants in Tamura and
Ramsden, however, the MLBPA was not arguing that all intermingled
evidence, even that which had been legally seized during the search, should
be suppressed. Rather, it sought return only of the test results and
information which did not pertain to the ten BALCO players.295 It was
undisputed that the government could keep and use the information
pertaining to the named BALCO players.2 96 Instead, the MLBPA objected
to the fact that the government intended to use the information obtained
from the seized directory to expand the focus of its investigation to all MLB
players who had tested positive.297
Despite the government's broadening of the scope of its initial
investigation, the CDT court found that return of the property was
unnecessary in this instance. 298 "While we agree that some information still
retained by the government, at least in duplicate, may fall outside the scope
of the warrant, we do not believe a return of the lawfully seized
intermingled evidence properly remedies that wrong. 299
While the government should be able to lawfully seize all intermingled
files where they are not subject to ready separation, it should not be allowed
to use those files or data which are unrelated to the scope of the original
292 Id. at 937 (majority opinion).
293 Id. This is a misreading of Tamura. The court never addressed the issue of whether
the unlawfully seized evidence had to be returned. It simply held that the "exclusionary rule
does not require suppression of evidence within the scope of a warrant simply because other
items outside the scope of the warrant were unlawfully taken as well." United States v.
Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 1982).
294 CDT, 473 F.3d at 937.
295 Id. at 924.
296 id.
297 Theoretically, the government could have even expanded its investigation to include
hockey players, track athletes, and other sports figures whose test results were contained in
the Tracey directory.
298 CDT, 473 F.3d at 938.
299 Id. There is certainly a legitimate argument that the test results of the hundred other
baseball players were relevant to the government's investigation of BALCO. However, this
would allow the government to retain evidence for which it admittedly had no probable
cause to obtain a warrant. Also, given the privacy concerns surrounding the test results,
retention of the results in this case is not proper.
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warrant. To hold otherwise would allow the government to sort through the
intermingled records and pick and choose which information could help
further its investigation or even to begin another independent one. If this
were indeed the case, what would be the purpose of limiting the scope of
the warrant in the first place?
4. The Ninth Circuit Provided for Only Post-Seizure Judicial Review
Despite its overbroad interpretation of Rule 41(g), the CDT court
attempted to lessen the impact of its ruling by refusing to grant the
government total carte blanche to review and use the seized material. It
recognized that the government should not have unfettered discretion to
determine which intermingled records should be returned and which should
not:
We cannot accept the government's argument that it may retain all evidence simply
because it assured the Player's Association and CDT (without signs of bad faith) that
it did not intend to use all the files. In the case of a lawful and reasonable seizure of
intermingled computer records for off-site review, as at bar, our precedents and the
general reasonableness mandate of the Fourth Amendment require the supervision of
a magistrate. It is not reasonable to allow the government to seize an indeterminately
bounded array of computer data only later to set its own standards for review and
retention thereof.
300
The court went on to lay out the procedure for such review, requiring that,
upon the filing of a proper post-seizure motion by the aggrieved party, the
record should be sealed and reviewed in camera by a magistrate.30 1
The court instructed that in reviewing the motion, the magistrate
should apply its ruling and prior precedents in a "balanced manner. '' 30 2 The
court noted that, in the context of a seizure of computer files, most seized
material can be substantially "pared down" but that certain files, such as
short spreadsheets, can be retained in whole. 303  After the magistrate
determines which sealed items fall within the scope of the search warrant,
the government may retain and use such items but must return all others to
the person or entity searched.30 4 Finally, the court made it clear that nothing
300 Id. (emphasis in original).
301 Id. at 939.
302 Id. at 940.
303 Id. In determining what evidence the government can "reasonably retain" after a
lawful seizure of intermingled computer data, the court stated that the magistrate may
consider among other factors: (1) whether evidence mentioned in the search warrant can be
separated from unrelated evidence by copying or moving files, but without creating new
documents; (2) whether the file, if printed, would fill more than a typical paper ledger (of the
sort in Beusch); (3) whether excision of the unrelated portions of the document would distort
the character of the original document. Id. at 940 n.45.
'04 Id. at 940.
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in its ruling precluded the government from subsequently seeking to expand
the scope of its investigation (through additional search warrants or district
court review of the magistrate's ruling) based upon a showing of "any
item's relevancy to suspected criminal behavior uncovered during review of
the evidence initially seized.,
30 5
This procedure loses almost all value, however, if it is implemented
after, not before, the government views the seized files. Judge Thomas
criticized the majority's new review procedure:
For a magistrate's role to be effective, it must come before the privacy interests have
been compromised. Under the majority's holding, the government is newly
empowered to search the data before the magistrate authorizes the search. This flips
the traditional relationship of the magistrate to the searching officer on its head. In all
other contexts, the magistrate stands between the government and the privacy of
individuals; in the majority's proposed world, the magistrate only appears after the
privacy interests have been invaded.
30 6
He pointed out that the ruling would allow the government to seize the
medical records of anyone who had the "misfortune" of visiting a hospital
or receiving treatment from a health care provider that kept patient records
in a master file which also coincidentally contained the data of a person
whose information was the subject of a search warrant.30 7 The dissent
concluded that the better practice would be to have the neutral magistrate
review the intermingled data first to ensure that "private information that
the government is not authorized to see remains private.' 30 8
More troubling, the majority's review procedure would become
effective only after an objection had been made to the seizure. If no
objection was forthcoming, then no review would take place. As the
dissent pointed out, "[H]ow precisely is an honest citizen to know if his or
her confidential medical records have been seized by the government so
that he or she may seek redress? ' 30 9 While the majority's procedure may
work fairly well in situations where the patient is aware of the seizure (such
as where the patient and the target of the investigation are one and the
same), it fails to account for those situations where an innocent third party
has no notice of the government's activities. Without notice, the third party
305 Id. This statement, along with other language in the opinion, seems to indicate the
court's assessment that the government should be entitled to retain the positive test results of
the hundred or so non-BALCO players upon a showing that the results are relevant to their
ongoing investigation of unlawful steroid distribution. In fact, the government applied for
such subsequent search warrants to do just that, based on the information obtained from the
Tracey directory. Id. at 923-24.
306 Id. at 974 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
307 Id. at 963-64.
308 Id. at 964-65.
309 Id. at 974.
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will have no opportunity to ask for review of the government's seizure of
his confidential records.
This concern is borne out by the facts of CDT. Of the thirteen major
sports organizations whose test results were contained on the Tracey
directory, MLB (whose players were the target of the subpoena) was the
only one to file an objection to the government's seizure of the records.3" °
The dissent identified the irony that this ruling will bring about: those
suspected of criminal activity will have notice and opportunity to object to
seizures while the completely innocent citizen will not.311 Thus, as the
dissent pointed out, this lack of notice is one of the reasons the use of
search warrants against innocent third-party repositories of records is
"strongly discouraged. '312
The protection of Fourth Amendment rights cannot be left to the winds
of chance. Something more is needed to preserve the privacy rights of
individuals when their records are seized pursuant to a police investigation.
At the very least, the government should have used a taint team to inspect
the data and sort it. More preferably, the record should have been sealed
immediately after the seizure of the Tracey directory, pending an inspection
by a magistrate. Instead, the proverbial cat is out of the bag. The privacy
and confidentiality of these records has been lost forever. Government
investigators know which players tested positive and for what. The
majority's provision for after-the-fact magistrate review does little more
than apply salve to the wound. Even worse, it may add injury to the insult
if the magistrate decides to let the government retain some of the material
seized outside the scope of the warrant and those players' identities are
eventually revealed.
IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE TO COMPUTER
SEARCHES
Although the Ninth Circuit did not rule on the question of whether the
plain view doctrine justified the government's seizure of the intermingled
files (as noted above, the court found it did not have to address the
question), the issue was extensively briefed and argued by the government
and is thus an important one to resolve for future computer searches. The
question of whether the plain view doctrine applies in the context of a
computer search is one which is subject to great debate. Some have argued
that the doctrine should apply equally in the context of both computer and
310 Id. at 976.
"' Id. at 974-75.
312 Id. at 974 n.18.
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physical searches; others have urged that it must be severely curtailed or
eliminated altogether from the computer search realm.
3 13
At first blush, the applicability of the plain view doctrine to a computer
search seems dubious. Ordinarily, when one thinks of the plain view
doctrine, one thinks of an officer who stumbles across contraband in open,
obvious view while conducting a search for evidence of some other
crime.314 If the officer does not have probable cause to believe that an
object in plain view is contraband without "conducting some further search
of the object," then the plain view doctrine does not apply.315 How, then,
can something initially hidden from the human eye be said to be in plain
view if it requires a computer analyst to first search the computer storage
media for the file and then employ a program to interpret it, making its
contents visible?
The answer lies in cases which have applied the doctrine to document
searches. Like computer searches, document searches require officers to at
least briefly examine all files to determine if they are covered under the
warrant. If, during that brief perusal, the document's incriminating nature
becomes obvious, officers are allowed to seize it under the plain view
doctrine. In United States v. Rude, the Ninth Circuit stated the analysis as
follows:
[Tihe incriminating character limitation necessarily permits a brief perusal of
documents in plain view in order to determine whether probable cause exists for their
seizure under the warrant. If in the course of that perusal, their otherwise
incriminating character becomes obvious, they may be seized. Otherwise, the perusal
must cease at the point at which the warrant's inapplicability to each document is
clear.
316
Some types of documents which courts have held to be incriminatory on
their face include papers relating to the sale or manufacture of drugs,
gambling records, fake identification cards, and documents linking the
defendant to known co-defendants.317  However, the court in Rude
313 Ziff, supra note 68, at 865-66. But see Kerr, supra note 66, at 582-83.
314 The plain view doctrine is commonly characterized as an exception to the warrant
requirement, allowing officers to seize objects that are outside the scope of the warrant but
that are patently contraband. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990). In order to
justify a warrantless seizure under the doctrine, three conditions must be satisfied: (1) the
officer must lawfully be in a position where the object can be plainly viewed, (2) the object
must be in plain view, and (3) the incriminating nature of the evidence must be "immediately
apparent." Id. at 136.
315 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).
316 United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1552 (9th Cir. 1996).
317 See United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1070 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v.




determined that the seizure of eighteen documents, which pre-dated the
warrant cutoff, were not in plain view because the officers' "immediate
observation" of the contested documents revealed that they were outside the
scope of the warrant.31 8
Only a handful of courts have addressed the question of whether the
plain view doctrine applies in the context of a computer search. Two cases
from the Tenth Circuit are instructive. In United States v. Carey, the court
held that the plain view doctrine could not be used to justify the officer's
search of JPG files once it was determined that such files did not contain
evidence related to the object of the warrant. 319 The court reasoned that the
detective had abandoned the initial purpose of his search by opening the
subsequent picture files:
We infer from his testimony Detective Lewis knew he was expanding the scope of his
search when he sought to open the JPG files. Moreover, at that point, he was in the
same position as the officers had been when they first wanted to search the contents of
the computers for drug related evidence. They were aware they had to obtain a search
warrant and did so. These circumstances suggest Detective Lewis knew clearly he
was acting without judicial authority when he abandoned his search for evidence of
drug dealing.
320
The court concluded that the detective could not have "inadvertently
discovered" the contents of each of the picture files he subsequently
opened.32  The court's ruling hinged on its belief that the detective did not
have authority under the warrant to view all files on the computer.3 22 The
court stated:
318 Rude, 88 F. 3d at 1522. But see In re Southeastern Equip. Co. Search Warrant, 746 F.
Supp. 1563, 1580 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (holding an address book seized from the office of a
salesman, whose files were not within the scope of the warrant because the companies that
were the target of the warrant were not his clients, fell under the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement because the book contained information which was immediately
apparent as being important to other ongoing investigations).
319 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999).
320 Id. at 1273. The court further found that it need not reach the question of what
constituted plain view because the images were located in "closed files" and thus "not in
plain view." Id.
321 Id. The court's conclusion is contradicted by the detective's testimony. He testified
that he believed he could search "these files [the image files] as well as any other files
contained [in the computer]." Id. at 1271. He also stated that until he opened each file, he
really did not know its contents, stating, "I wasn't conducting a search for child
pornography, that happened to be what these turned out to be." Id. Therefore, it appears the
court was making a credibility determination-namely that the officer could not have
reasonably been searching for evidence relating to the warrant when he searched the image
files.
322 Ziff frames the analysis a little differently:
The questions addressed by the court [in Carey] should not have been "Were the files in plain
view?" and "Were the files particularly listed in the warrant?" Indeed, the answer to these
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In our judgment, the case turns upon the fact that each of the files containing
pornographic material was labeled "JPG" and most featured a sexually suggestive
title. Certainly after opening the first file and seeing an image of child pornography,
the searching officer was aware-in advance of opening the remaining files-what
the label meant. When he opened the subsequent files, he knew he was not going to
find items related to drug activity as specified in the warrant, just like the officer in
Turner knew he was not going to find evidence of an assault as authorized by the
consent.
323
In United States v. Walser, the Tenth Circuit re-affirmed the
inadvertence requirement of Carey.324 There, the agent testified that he
opened an AVI file (a video file) which contained an image of child
pornography during the course of his search of a computer hard drive for
evidence of drug transactions.325 The court found that the opening of the
AVI file, like the discovery of the first child pornography file in Carey, was
proper since it was an inadvertent discovery. 26
These cases resurrected the inadvertent discovery requirement, which
while at one time had been an element of the plain view doctrine, has since
been eliminated.327 The Supreme Court in Horton v. California held that:
[E]venhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective
standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of
mind of the officer. The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and
fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the
search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception
to the warrant requirement.
328
The court suggested instead that "[s]crupulous adherence" to the
particularity requirement serves to limit the area and duration of the search
that the inadvertence requirement "inadequately protects. 329  Since an
object seized in plain view does not involve an intrusion on privacy, the
court concluded that if such an invasion of privacy had occurred, it must
have occurred before the object came into plain view.33
questions is "no." Rather, the court should have asked, "Did the warrant authorize the opening
of the file?" and "If so, did the plain view doctrine justify the officer's seizure of that file?"
Ziff, supra note 68, at 854.
323 Carey, 172 F.3dat 1274.
324 275 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2001).
325 Id. at 984-85.
326 The court distinguished the facts from Carey because the agent, unlike the detective
in Carey, immediately ceased his search and obtained a subsequent warrant for child
pornography. Id. at 987.
327 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971).
328 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990).
329 Id. at 139-40.
330 Id. at 140.
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The unworkable nature of the inadvertence requirement espoused in
Carey and Walser is highlighted by the facts of United States v. Gray.
331
There, the agent opened picture files contained in two suspicious directories
labeled "Teen" and "Tiny Teen., 332 The court distinguished its case from
Carey on the ground that the agent testified that he continued the focus of
his original search, even after the initial discovery of the first pornographic
photograph.333 However, unlike the Tenth Circuit, the Gray court permitted
the officer to open all files pursuant to the warrant to search the computer,
not just those limited by key word or file type.334 Thus, even though the
testimony of the officers was virtually identical with respect to how the
computer search was carried out, the courts came to opposite conclusions as
to the officers' subjective intent.
Because of these problems, Kerr argues for a severe curtailment or
even complete elimination of the plain view doctrine from computer
searches. 335  Kerr rejects the Carey inadvertence approach because its
"critical weakness" is trying to determine the subjective intent of an officer
in the computer context. 336  Because agencies often develop guidelines
which mandate very thorough searches, he concludes, "When every step
taken by an analyst is a matter of routine policy, it becomes difficult to
exclude evidence on the ground that the analyst was attempting to
circumvent the warrant., 337 Kerr suggests the plain view doctrine could be
applied to serious crimes only or may have to be eliminated altogether for
digital searches:
Although forensic practices may be invasive by technological necessity, a total
suppression rule for evidence beyond the scope of a warrant would both remove any
incentive for broad searches and neutralize the effect of broad searches that occur. It
would regulate invasive practices by imposing use restrictions ex post rather than
attempting to control searches ex ante, offering a long-term second-best approach to
regulating the computer forensics process. In short, it would allow the police to
"' 78 F. Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Va. 1999).
332 Id. at 527.
133 Id. at 528-29. The difference between Carey and Gray is not that clear cut. In Gray,
the agent first opened JPG files in the "Teen" directory which appeared to contain images of
adult pornography. He next opened the "Tiny Teen" subdirectory. While the agent admitted
that the name did cause him to wonder if it contained images of child pornography, he
testified that he opened the files in the subdirectory because it was the next subdirectory
listed, and he was opening all of the subdirectories as part of his search for material listed
under the warrant. Only after he viewed several of the images in the "Tiny Teen" directory
did the agent cease his search and apply for a second warrant to search for additional images
of child pornography. Id. at 527.
334 Id. at 529; see also discussion of Gray supra Part II.
335 Kerr, supra note 66, at 577.
336 Id. at 578.
331 Id. at 579.
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conduct whatever search they needed to conduct (to ensure recovery) and then limit
use of the evidence found (to deter abuses).
338
Perhaps the better argument for eliminating the plain view doctrine
from the realm of digital searches is that the concerns justifying its use in
the physical search context are often lacking in computer searches. The
practical justification for allowing the police to make a warrantless seizure
of evidence in plain view is to spare the police "the inconvenience and the
risk-to themselves or to preservation of the evidence-of going to obtain a
warrant., 339 That concern is not often present in the computer context. In
executing a computer search, government agents often will either seize the
original computer hardware and/or storage media or make a full bitstream
copy of the data, removing it from the control of the suspect.340 Thus, any
delay in obtaining a subsequent warrant would not risk the disappearance of
any evidence or the safety of the officers because the computer files would
remain in the constant control of government investigators.34'
V. A PROTOCOL FOR COMPUTER SEARCHES IN THE FUTURE
The lesson that this article has hopefully provided is that a more
systematic and consistent approach to computer searches is needed.
Investigators' efforts should not be unduly hampered in one jurisdiction
while going virtually unchecked in another. Such inconsistent application
of the law makes it difficult for computer owners to develop and implement
policies designed to protect privacy, particularly for business owners whose
servers are located in multiple jurisdictions.
Resolving this conflict involves weighing two competing interests: (1)
the privacy rights of an individual or business in the computer data, and (2)
the government's need for flexibility in conducting searches of such data.
Balancing these interests is particularly tricky, however, given the inherent
difficulties in predicting the technological sophistication of a particular
338 Id. at 584.
339 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987).
340 Agent Reese confirmed that it is not inconvenient for forensic investigators to obtain
a new warrant for material that is discovered pursuant to the original warrant but which is
outside the scope of the investigation. The process usually takes only a few hours.
Interview with Collin Reese, supra note 20.
341 Judge Thomas made this point in his dissent in United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc.
Electronic data is simply not the kind of evidence that forms a natural extension of an officer's
discovery of obvious contraband in a public place. The fact that further careful electronic
assistance is required outside the searched premises to interpret the data belies the "practical"
justification that there is insufficient time to obtain a warrant.
473 F.3d 915, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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suspect. Some investigations may require relatively simple inspections of
the directories and files of a given computer system to uncover the desired
information; others may require lengthy and complicated search
methodologies to defeat encryption or other techniques used to mask the
true identity of the contents of a file. The problem confronting investigators
in the context of digital searches is that criminals rarely advertise the fact
that such encryption techniques have been used. Unlike most physical
searches, the investigator cannot simply look at a computer and tell whether
the files have been encrypted. Therefore, he cannot predict ahead of time
which type of search to expect.
Another difficulty in deciding what rules to apply to computer
searches is that the methodologies and tools needed for conducting such
searches are dramatically different from those needed to search a house or a
car. The tools used to search in the physical world are relatively basic: light
sources, a good pair of eyes, and a keen intuition for ferreting out evidence.
The investigator might also make use of simple technology such as
fingerprint powder or Luminol to illuminate evidence unseen to the naked
eye. The investigator often needs something more than the digital
equivalent of these tools in searching a computer because nothing is visible
to the naked eye. Even for the most basic computer search, the analyst
must use software to translate the digital data into some recognizable form.
Thus, trying to analogize digital computer searches to traditional
physical searches is problematic. This analogy would be akin to the courts
having compared the search of automobiles to horse-drawn carriages or
houses when they first appeared on the scene. Instead, courts should just
treat computers for what they are and analyze the Fourth Amendment issues
accordingly. Yet simply because the technology has changed does not
mean that traditional analyses of Fourth Amendment issues should be
discarded. While adjustments may be necessary to conform search and
seizure law to digital principles, a wholesale makeover or "special
approach" to accommodate them is unnecessary.
In order to develop a consistent set of guidelines to help frame search
and seizure law in this area, the first issue that must be decided is what
information the warrant should contain to authorize the seizure of
computers and digital storage devices. To comply with the Fourth
Amendment probable cause requirement, an officer must first demonstrate
that the computer or storage media in question will contain evidence of the
alleged crime. Officers should not be allowed to seize computers and other
digital devices based on vague assertions that computers generally may
contain relevant evidence of criminal activity. Because I argue that officers
should be entitled to inspect the contents of a computer freely once they
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have shown proper justification for its seizure, this step is particularly
important to protecting personal privacy interests.
Under current law, once investigators have demonstrated probable
cause to enter a home or office, they are allowed to search any place the
object of their search is likely to be found.342 Depending on the type of
object sought, a computer could be viewed as merely another container to
be searched. Since the computer is, in effect, the digital equivalent of a
house due to its immense storage capacity and the variety of information
capable of being stored on it, courts should view computers as the front
door of a house or office, rather than just another object or container found
within the house. This standard would require a showing of particularized
suspicion before any computer or storage device found within the home or
office could be searched. It would prevent computers from being treated
like traditional containers, which can at most hold a few pairs of clothes or
other objects.
In most cases, this requirement would have little practical effect.
Where it is suspected that the computer is intimately involved in the
commission of the crime-as in computer fraud or child pornography-the
government will have little trouble making this showing of particularized
suspicion.343 For example, if the allegation is that a doctor has committed
Medicare fraud, it is perfectly logical to assume that the medical records
evidencing the fraud are kept on the medical office's computer system.
However, where only generalized suspicion exists as to a computer's
relevance to the suspected criminal activity or as a possible repository for
evidence, then the government should not be allowed to search a computer
for evidence of a crime. Assume agents have a warrant to search the house
for evidence of alleged sale and manufacture of drugs. While the agents
would be permitted to search areas of the home and containers where such
evidence could be found, they would not be permitted to search a computer
found in the home based on general allegations alone. They would have to
demonstrate probable cause exists, separate and apart from the first warrant
to search the home, that the computer contains evidence of drug sales or
manufacture such as statements from an informant that the suspect kept
such information on his computer.
Once it has been demonstrated that officers have a lawful right to seize
a computer, the next question that must be addressed is under what
342 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982) (holding a warrant that authorizes
an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets,
chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found).
343 Agent Reese stated that it would "not be a big issue" to add a paragraph to a warrant
if officers discovered a computer during a search and had reason to believe it contained
evidence relating to the investigation. Interview with Collin Reese, supra note 20.
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circumstances should officers be allowed to remove computer equipment to
an off-site location for inspection and potential copying. Judge Kozinski
argued quite eloquently in Hill that the difficulties inherent in conducting
computer searches are so well known today that officers need not detail
these concerns in their affidavits. 344  The Ninth Circuit rejected this
approach, instead requiring that the affidavit spell out the reasons for
believing such removal will be necessary. 345 This requirement seems to put
form over substance. Given its obvious complexities, common sense
suggests that the off-site search of a computer is more convenient for both
examiner and computer owner. As long as the owner is not deprived of use
of the computer for an unreasonable period of time, off-site inspection
and/or copying of relevant files or directories is the preferable search
method in this context.
The more troubling question is how to separate relevant computer data
and files from intermingled, irrelevant data. Winick advocated the adoption
of the Tamura procedure for all computer searches, requiring the
impoundment of the computer data until a magistrate has had an
opportunity to review it and separate the relevant from the irrelevant.
346
While this method sounds good in theory, I hazard to guess it would prove
unworkable in practice. If law enforcement officials had to stop their
investigation and seek judicial oversight every time they seized a computer,
law enforcement would grind to a halt in the United States. This scenario
would be akin to requiring law enforcement officials to impound the
contents of a desk or a car before being allowed to search it. The Fourth
Amendment does not require the use of such judicial handcuffs. As long as
an officer demonstrates he has probable cause to search the computer, then
he should be allowed to search all of its contents without having to sort the
data first. If an individual is foolish enough to store evidence of criminal
activity on the same computer that he stores personal information, then he
should suffer the invasion of privacy that comes with the territory, just as if
he had placed the intermingled information in a desk drawer.
However, the search of a business computer requires a more concerted
effort to separate the wheat from the chaff. Wholesale seizures of the
records of a business are unwarranted, absent extraordinary
circumstances.347 As a result, when applying for a warrant to search
business computers, law enforcement officers should have to demonstrate
344 United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
345 United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir. 2006).
346 Winick, supra note 51, at 107.
347 See United States v. Offices Known as 50 State Distrib. Co., 708 F.2d 1371, 1374
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984) (permitting wholesale seizure of business
records where business is "permeated with fraud").
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probable cause for the seizure of particular servers, desktop computers,
directories, and storage media that may contain the sought-after material. If
that requirement is not possible beforehand, the officers must provide for
procedures to accomplish this task on site. To that end, agents applying for
a search warrant of a business should describe procedures for
accomplishing this on-site sorting to assure the magistrate that they are
taking no more than what is necessary and will avoid the wholesale removal
of business computers.
In addition, where it is anticipated beforehand or discovered during the
search that records of innocent third parties, unconnected to the allegations
of criminal activity, are intermingled with the records evidencing a crime,
then the procedures for magistrate review outlined in Tamura should be
implemented. This is the only way to ensure that the privacy rights of
innocent third parties are not violated and the confidentiality of the records
will be maintained. In such instances, the investigator must seek judicial
assistance to separate out the irrelevant, third-party files before searching
further.348 The magistrate could either conduct the review himself with the
assistance of a forensic investigator or appoint a special master to do the
same. In order to protect the privacy of such third parties, this review must
occur before, not after, the investigator has had an opportunity to search the
files (as was the case in CDT).3 49
While the use of taint teams has been approved by some courts as an
available alternative to judicial oversight, their use should be strongly
discouraged and limited to specific situations where judicial oversight
would be impractical. 350  The use of taint teams still reveals the files'
content to investigators; it just attempts to minimize the damage resulting
from that disclosure by erecting a Chinese Wall. It can hardly be
comforting to innocent third parties that the sanctity of their records
depends solely on the integrity of the members of the taint team. Members
348 This rule would be easy to implement in the context of the search of a business office
where it is expected that such records will be intermingled. However, it is not so easy to
implement where a laptop, used for both business and personal reasons, is seized. One can
imagine a situation where the officers seize a laptop which at first blush appeared to contain
only personal files, but upon further examination was discovered to also contain business
records. In such an instance, the officer should stop the search of the computer and apply for
a magistrate's assistance in sorting out the relevant material from the irrelevant, and
potentially confidential, business information.
349 Kerr advocates the use of search protocols in this instance: "Search protocols may be
useful in specific circumstances. For example, searches of computers believed to contain
privileged documents present special concerns. In such cases, investigators may specify a
search protocol to explain how the analysts will handle privileged documents." Kerr, supra
note 66, at 576 n.199.
350 For example, if the material is particularly complex or voluminous, the use of a
magistrate or special master may unreasonably delay an investigation or prosecution.
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of a taint team may not always be as diligent as they should be in
351performing their duties or may not have purely noble motives. Who is to
say that a prosecutor, who discovers evidence of criminal activity unrelated
to the main focus of the investigation, will not have an incentive to disclose
the confidential information and pursue that lead? As a result, the use of
taint teams should be strictly limited.
Regardless of what review method is chosen, these special procedures
should be reserved for cases implicating heightened confidentiality and
privacy concerns such as searches of medical or law offices. Searches of
personal computer or regular business records do not implicate such
concerns, and thus they should not be subjected to this extra layer of
judicial oversight.
The CDT decision also poses a related question: Should the
government be allowed to execute search warrants against independent
third parties who are not targets of the investigation, or should subpoenas be
the exclusive investigatory tool permitted to be used in such instances? The
preferred method for obtaining this material is obviously by subpoena. The
issuance of the subpoena provides notice to the third party such that it has
an opportunity to litigate issues of privacy, confidentiality, and overbreadth
prior to the seizure of the records. The justifications for using search
warrants-to preserve the element of surprise and prevent destruction of
records-are often lacking in these situations. However, where the use of a
warrant is necessary (such as where the object of the investigation works in
the medical or law office where the records are kept), investigators must
identify these reasons in their warrant application.
The next issue that must be resolved is whether courts should adopt the
second part of the Carey/Winick approach, which requires that officers use
specific search protocols in conducting searches of hard drives and other
storage media. The Winick approach would permit officers to use more
invasive search techniques only where they can articulate their suspicions
that the suspect has encrypted or altered the files.352 This requirement is
unworkable. As detailed by Orin Kerr, forensic computer examiners cannot
easily predict the course their searches may take.353 Examiners may
351 The recent admission of a Colorado Springs attorney to leaking transcripts of the
BALCO grand jury testimony to San Francisco Chronicle reporters is a case in point.
Although bound by legal and ethical obligations not to reveal secret grand jury testimony,
the attorney violated the sanctity of the grand jury. The attorney's agreement to plead guilty
will keep the reporters from serving jail time as a result of their refusal to give provide his
name as the source of the leak. Troy E. Renck, Reporters to Avoid Jail with Lawyer's Plea,
DENV. POST, Apr. 15, 2007, available at http://www.denverpost.com/ search/ci_5229261.
352 Agent Reese notes that he has encountered very few cases where suspects have
encrypted files. Interview with Collin Reese, supra note 20.
353 Kerr, supra note 66, at 575.
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encounter suspects who have deleted files in an effort to hide their tracks,
and as such, will have to search every file to look for and retrieve deleted
files.354 In addition, examiners should not be required to take the suspect's
word for it that the files are labeled properly. This would be akin to forcing
investigators who had come upon paper files written in a foreign language
to rely on the accuracy of the suspect's translation.
Given that officers should be permitted to inspect all files on a hard
drive, then the question of whether the plain view doctrine should apply
must be answered next. As outlined in Part IV, the justifications underlying
the plain view doctrine are typically not present in the computer search
realm. 355  Since the evidence remains under the control of investigators
while it is being searched, the additional step of applying for a second
warrant to seize new evidence creates a minimal burden. Assuming
arguendo that the plain view doctrine should apply to computer searches, it
should only be applied in a limited set of circumstances where the
incriminating character of the evidence is obvious on its face. If it takes
more than a casual glance to determine the file's incriminatory character,
then the government cannot justify its seizure under the plain view doctrine.
On the other hand, if its incriminatory character is obvious (such as a photo
of child pornography or some other crime) then its seizure should be
permitted.356
VI. CONCLUSION
The CDT decision is notable because it touches on several issues on
the frontier of digital search and seizure law. It is laudable for the freedom
it gives officers to conduct digital searches due to their inherent complexity.
However, it sets a dangerous precedent with respect to both the limited
amount of protection it provides to third parties whose medical records have
354 Interview with Collin Reese, supra note 20.
355 See supra Part IV and note 341.
356 Ziff looks at the plain view doctrine from a slightly different angle. Under this
doctrine, in order for the contents of a file to be seized, he hypothesizes that the
determination of its incriminatory nature must occur within the time it takes to determine if
the document is within the scope of the warrant:
During the time in which the warrant allows a searching officer to view the contents of a file, the
second condition of the plain view doctrine must be met-the incriminating character of the file
must be immediately apparent. After a determination can be made that the contents of a given
file are outside the scope of the warrant, the officer's authority to examine that file under the
warrant expires. Therefore, if the incriminating character of a file only becomes apparent after
the officer has determined that the file is outside the scope of files to be seized under the warrant,
the plain view doctrine cannot apply because the authority of the warrant has expired and the
officer is no longer in a lawful position from which to view the file.
Ziff, supra note 68, at 866.
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been seized pursuant to a search warrant and the standard that it sets for
determining motions for return of property. In the Ninth Circuit's view, as
long as government agents can assert some legitimate need or interest in
seized property, such as relevance to an ongoing or even a potential future
criminal investigation, the government can review confidential medical
records of innocent third parties and retain copies of the seized
information.357
In their zeal to ferret out illegal steroid distribution, government
investigators trampled on the rights of over a hundred baseball players and
countless other professional athletes. Confidential medical records
containing the most private of information (drug screen results) were
exposed to prying eyes.358 All of this was done in flagrant disregard of
Department of Justice regulations which expressly prohibited the conduct
engaged in by the government in this instance. The Ninth Circuit was all
too happy to oblige by sanctioning their tactics. What's next? Will Lance
Armstrong's chemotherapy records be subject to review if the government
decides to investigate allegations of blood doping during the Tour de
France? Then, if his records are intermingled with other patient records,
will those unrelated records be subject to review as well? The Framers of
the Fourth Amendment could not have intended such perverse results.
Courts that consider these issues in the future should be wary of
granting the government too much power. If the government is granted this
much leeway in investigating the crime of illegal drug distribution, what
check, if any, will be left if the alleged crime is terrorism? The CDT
decision highlights the need for the Supreme Court to lay out a set of
consistent guidelines which will protect both the privacy interests of the
individual and at the same time accommodate law enforcement's legitimate
need for flexibility in conducting computer searches.
"' CDT, 473 F.3d 915, 937 (9th Cir. 2006).
358 As discussed previously in Part III.A, the government agents seized the Tracey
directory which contained almost 3000 drug test results for various sports. See supra note
227. The agents used the information to obtain new search warrants to seize all specimens
and records relating to the over one hundred non-BALCO players. Id. at 924.
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